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ARTICLE
The Right to Know and the Duty to Disclose:
Pathways to Effective Monitoring, Reporting,
and Verification within the Constitutionalism
of Climate Justice
TERESA THORP*
Amartya Sen once wrote: “In fact, the real ‘bite’ of a theory of
justice can, to a great extent, be understood from its
informational base: what information is—or is not—taken to be
directly relevant.”1 The relevancy of substantive guarantees may
be the poignant element of an objective threshold of justice, but
accountability, integrity, and temporality, discipline a subjective
threshold. Development is freedom, but the “willingness and
capacity” to discipline information for effective justice is the
oxygen of that freedom.2
In certain lex specialis regimes, the right to information,
public participation, and access to justice, form three pillars that
guarantee the objectivity of effective justice. In the subjective or
behavioral context of the right to information, the right to know
and the duty to disclose are fundamental for mobilizing the legal

* BCM and PG. Dip Com. (Econ.), (New Zealand); LLB (Hons.) and LPC
(London); MBA (Duke); LLM/DEA International Law (Paris). Researcher
Utrecht University. Director Insight International (international sustainable
development advocates). Email: teresa.thorp@insight-int.org or t.m.thorp@uu.nl.
This paper builds on InsightInt Working Paper No. 2010.10.03 of 2010, which
derived a unified approach to the legal principles of international climate law,
and Working Paper No. 2011.04.11 of 2011, which subsequently refined the
model. It incorporates an update of an analysis of options for emissions
reporting submitted to the UK’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs in 2011.
1. AMARTYA KUMAR SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 57 (1999) (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted); see also AMARTYA KUMAR SEN, INEQUALITY
REEXAMINED 73 (1995).
2. Calling of an International Conference on Freedom of Information, G.A.
Res. 59(I), at 95, U.N. GAOR, 1st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/59(I) (Dec. 14, 1946)
[hereinafter Calling of an Int’l Conf. on Freedom of Info.].
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principle of equity. Similarly, in international climate law, there
is not only a need to guarantee rights. Fulfilling rights is also
intrinsic to a unified legal theory of climate justice.
Notwithstanding these hard fought freedoms, the right to
information is not always effective in international law. Custom
may reinforce a maxim inherited from French civil law, “donner
et retenir ne vaut.” (There is no point in giving with one hand and
taking away with the other). If the legitimate donor of the right
to information reserves the right to revoke the right at will, or
even retains possession of the right without giving it any effect at
all, then this renders the right virtually worthless in all but the
rarest of occasions.
These concerns impinge on “elements” of normative validity.
Just because a norm is “well-formed” does not mean it is valid.
Even if the norm is valid, it may not be “well-formed.” A valid
norm ought to conform to its specification. To focus on the quality
of the normative specification, which is a question of justice, this
Article concerns two elements that are prerequisites to validate
inter vivos equity but considers them within the context of the
right to information. First, rights and obligations must be
legitimate. This is an objective element. It is a question of fact.
Second, rights and obligations must be effective. Rights and
obligations must come into effect at least at some point in time.
A question of effect entails a subjective element of fairness.
The subjective test may incorporate a test of conduct or procedure
but the test may not necessarily have to trigger in the present. In
terms of validating equity for future generations, the legal norm
may come into effect in the future. Consequently, it may not
require a claim by an existing person with full capacity. Future
beneficiaries may also hold an equitable title due to an entrusted
fiduciary duty that links present and future generations.
Besides its objective context, an “effective” climate law ought
to incorporate a subjective element of intra and intergenerational fairness as well. Care must therefore ensue in
trying to delimit “procedural equity” from “substantive equity.”
Giving effect to legal equity may not be purely procedural at all.
It may also require the reconciliation of informational freedoms
with proactive (anticipatory) and reactive (responsive)
obligations. This Article demonstrates what these issues may
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mean in practice for states and non-state actors. It engages with
legal science and jurisprudence to compare and contrast some
existing and some prospective climate disclosure obligations. It
also flags the transposition of state attribution to shared
responsibility from the perspective of the right to know and the
duty to disclose. In drawing to a conclusion, the paper suggests
that normative pathways that guarantee and fulfill the right to
information as a normative derivative of legal equity may
contribute to an evolving constitutionalism of the fundamental
legal principles of international climate law.
The Article is in two parts. Part one sets the scene. It
examines the dynamic interactions between the right to
information, human rights, and environmental law from an
objective perspective. It situates monitoring, reporting, and
verification (MRV) within a new architecture of human rights as
“people’s rights.” Part two then delves into how international
human rights and environmental law may inform a “subjective”
test of equity by mobilizing the “right to information” in
international climate law. In doing so, it shows how a new
approach to international legal architecture, one based on
“people’s rights,” may help to improve the effectiveness of MRV in
terms of multi-nodal and multi-level governance.
I.

THE NEXUS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW, INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, AND THE RIGHT TO
INFORMATION

A. International Human Rights and the Right to
Information
Already at its very first session in 1946, the United Nations
(U.N.) General Assembly considered that, “freedom of information
is a fundamental human right . . . [It is] the touchstone of all the
freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated.”3 The U.N.
General Assembly observed further that the, “[f]reedom of
information requires as an indispensable element the willingness

3. Id.
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and capacity to employ its privileges without abuse. It requires
as a basic discipline the moral obligation to seek the facts without
prejudice and to spread knowledge without malicious intent.”4 In
1948, by virtue of Article 19 of the U.N.’s Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the parties thereto declared, “[e]veryone [every
individual and every organ in society] has the right to freedom of
opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers.”5
By 1966, international treaties expressed the right to
information as a fundamental first generation right. The global
community framed the right to information as a civil and political
right.
By virtue of Article 19(2), State parties to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966)
agreed that, “[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of
expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers,
either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through
any other media of his choice.”6
In their normative context, international declarations
proclaimed the right to information as a fundamental human
right but international actors still did not necessarily consider
international norms binding or effective. They could not be
legally effective if they did not have legal force. A number of U.N.
member states recognized that anchoring legal rules to protect
individual rights to seek, receive, and impart information was one
avenue that could facilitate the fulfillment of international
norms. Discussions ensued. Dialogue within U.N. corridors
raised the potential to put an international treaty on the freedom
of information on the negotiating table, but such a treaty has
never come to fruition.

4. Id.
5. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A
(XXI), at 52, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16,
1966).
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In 1965, the U.N. General Assembly recognized that the right
to information was important, but not important enough. It had,
in its words, too “heavy [an] agenda” to consider either the
submitted draft Convention on Freedom of Information or the
draft Declaration on Freedom of Information, and “decide[d] to
devote . . . as much time as it deems necessary to the
consideration of the item on freedom of information” at its next
session.7 In 1970, the U.N. General Assembly acknowledged that
the draft Convention on the Freedom of Information had been
sitting on its table for “eighteen years” and decided to give it
priority at its next session.8 Future U.N. sessions were of a
similar resolve. Diplomacy prevailed.
Parties to the U.N. recognize the emergence of a new world
information order as a fundamental right but putting it into effect
is difficult. The process is slow. In diplomatic parlance, it is an
“evolving and continuous process.”9 In 2010, the U.N.’s General
Assembly reaffirmed as much when it remarked that it had a
“commitment to the principles of the Charter of the United
Nations and to the principles of freedom of the press and freedom
of
information,”
but
limited
that
commitment
to
10
recommendations.
Notwithstanding, the U.N.’s 2010 General Assembly
resolution on “Questions Relating to Information, Information in
the Service of Humanity, and the United Nations Public
Information Policies and Activities” was an important step
forward. The General Assembly urged all stakeholders, including
countries, U.N. organizations, and the media to “cooperate and
interact with a view to reducing existing disparities in
information flows at all levels . . . and to ensure the free flow of
information at all levels.”11
The U.N. General Assembly
reinforced this message in December 2011 when it requested

7. Freedom of Information, G.A. Res. 2061 (XX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2061 (Dec.
16, 1965).
8. Freedom of Information, G.A. Res. 2722 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2722
(Dec. 15, 1970).
9. G.A. Res. 65/107, A-B, U.N. Doc. A/RES/65/107 (Dec. 10, 2010).
10. Id.
11. Id.
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the Department of Public Information and its network of United
Nations information centres to pay particular attention to
progress in
implementing
the
internationally
agreed
development goals, including those contained in the Millennium
Declaration, and the outcomes of the major related United
Nations summits and conferences in carrying out its activities,
and calls upon the Department to play an active role in raising
public awareness of . . . the global challenge of climate change, in
particular the actions taken within the framework of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, especially in
the context of the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities . . . .12

Several crosscutting second-generation human rights’
instruments also incorporate a right to information. For the
purposes of this Article, second-generation human rights’
instruments refer to legal instruments that give impetus to
economic, social, and cultural equality. Certain treaties recognize
the rights of women, children, and the disabled to information.
The 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) recognizes the right of
“[a]ccess to specific educational information to help to ensure the
health and well-being of families . . . .”13 The 1989 Convention on
the Rights of the Child provides for the right of the child to
“receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless
of frontiers . . . .”14 The 2006 Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities endows people with extra needs with a right to
information.15
Typically voiced as positive rights, the rights to information
aforementioned prescribe social conduct. Positive rights oblige

12. Questions relating to information, G.A. Res. 66/81 A-B, at 4, U.N. GAOR,
66th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/66/81 A-B (Dec. 9, 2011).
13. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, G.A. Res. 34/180, at 193, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, U.N.
Doc. A/34/46 (Dec. 18, 1979).
14. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, annex, at 167,
U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Nov. 20, 1989).
15. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106,
art. 9(2)(f), U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/106 (Dec. 13, 2006).
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action. Negative rights curtail action.16 To illustrate the
distinction, consider the 2006 Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities. Parties to the 2006 Convention agreed,
inter alia, to “promote other appropriate forms of assistance and
support to persons with disabilities to ensure their access to
information.”17 The parties thereto also agreed to “take all
appropriate measures to ensure that persons with disabilities can
exercise the right to freedom of expression and opinion, including
the freedom to seek, receive and impart information . . . .”18
“Promoting appropriate forms of assistance” and “taking all
appropriate measures” are expressions of positive rights.
While the right to seek, receive, and impart information is a
fundamental human right, that right is subject to certain limits.
There is no right to incite racial divides or hatred. There is no
right to use information as a vehicle for corruption.
Informational relevancy is important, but so too is its discipline.
For the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO) “information . . . is a vital factor in the
strengthening of peace and international understanding”; but it
should be subject to a certain degree of discipline.19 UNESCO’s
1978 Declaration on Fundamental Principles concerning the
Contribution of the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and
International Understanding, to the Promotion of Human Rights
and to Countering Racialism, Apartheid and Incitement to War,
is illustrative. It provides in its very first article that, “[t]he
strengthening of peace and international understanding, the
promotion of human rights and the countering of racialism,
apartheid and incitement to war demand a free flow and a wider
and better balanced dissemination of information.”20

16. John Stuart Mill once spoke of positive and negative liberties. See
generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (1982).
17. Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, supra note 15, at
art. 9(2)(f).
18. Id. art. 21.
19. Declaration on Fundamental Principles Concerning the Contribution of
the Mass Media to Strengthening Peace and International Understanding, to
the Promotion of Human Rights and to Countering Racialism, Apartheid and
Incitement to War, UNESCO Res. 4/9.3/2 (Nov. 28, 1978).
20. Id.
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The U.N.’s 2003 Convention Against Corruption, which
entered into force in 2005, also contains a number of provisions
concerning the “right to information.”21
In its hortatory
language, the Convention provides for certain guidelines. Under
“public reporting,” the Convention Against Corruption provides
support for public access measures on decision-making
concerning public interests.22 On the issue of “participation of
society,” the Convention Against Corruption provides that the
participation of non-state actors be strengthened by “ensuring
that the public has effective access to information.”23
On February 3, 2010, a group of preeminent rapporteurs on
the Freedom of Opinion and Expression, the Freedom of the
Media, and the Access to Information issued a joint declaration
identifying the central challenges to freedom of expression over
Rapporteurs from the U.N., the
the coming decade.24
Organization of American States (OAS), the Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the African
Commission listed “Limits on the Right to Information” among
the ten key challenges over the coming decade.25 The U.N., the
OAS, the OSCE, and the African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights recognized further that “some 50 laws [have] been
passed in the last ten years” but the right to information is often
expressed without guarantee.
In many States, right to

21. Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, art. 10(a), U.N. GAOR,
58th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/58/422 (Oct. 31, 2003); see also TRANSPARENCY
INT’L, USING THE RIGHT TO INFORMATION AS AN ANTI-CORRUPTION TOOL (Nurhan
Kocaoglu, et al. eds. 2006), available at http://www.oas.org/dil/access_to_i
nformation_human_Policy_Recommendations_Transparency_International_Rig
ht_to_Information_as_an_Anti-Corruption_Tool.pdf
22. Convention Against Corruption, supra note 21.
23. Id. art. 13(1)(b).
24. The rapporteurs included the U.N.’s Special Rapporteur on Freedom of
Opinion and Expression, the Organization of American States (OAS) Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s (OSCE) Representative on Freedom of the Media, and the
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Expression and Access to Information.
25. Press Release, Org. of Am. States Inter-American Comm’n on Human
Rights, Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
2010: Ten Key Challenges to Freedom of Expression in the Next Decade, U.N.
Press Release No. R18/10 (2010).
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information laws are weak; and then there is “[t]he massive
challenge of implementing the right to information in practice.”26
Endeavors to transpose and bind the right to information
also exist at regional and national levels. According to its
website, the non-governmental organization Article 19 defends
and promotes freedom of expression and freedom of information
globally. Article 19 reported in 2010 that “over 90 countries have
adopted RTI [right to information] laws.”27 A similar impetus
drives regional groupings. Developments in Africa, the Americas,
and Europe are illustrative.
In terms of national endeavors, several countries have
tailored freedom of information laws to address specific issues.
The French law of July 17, 1978 recognizes the right for all
persons to obtain administrative documents (the Commission
d’Accès aux Documents Administratifs manages the process).28
In England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, the Freedom of
Information Act of 2000 gives citizens a right of access to
information held by public authorities (the U.K.’s Office of the
Information Commissioner regulates the implementation of the
Freedom of Information Act and fulfills a proactive obligation of
research, education, and public awareness).29 The U.S. has
adopted a Freedom of Information Act that provides agency rules
for making public information available (the Department of
Justice’s Office of Information Policy oversees agency

26. Id.
27. XIX ARTICLE 19, THE ARTICLE 19 GLOBAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION INDEX 1
(2010), available at http://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/press/rti-index.pdf.
28. Loi 78-753 du 17 Juillet 1978 Portant Diverses Mesures d’amélioration
Des Relations Entre l’Administration et le Public et Diverses Dispositions
d’ordre Administratif, Social et Fiscal, Titre Ier: De la Liberté d'Accès aux
Documents Administratifs et de la Réutilisation des Informations Publiques
[Law 78-753 of July 17, 1978 on Various Measure to Improve Relations Between
the Administration and the Public and Various Administrative, Social and
Fiscal, Title I: Freedom of Access to Administrative Documents and Reuse of
Public Information], JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE [J.O.]
[OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF FRANCE], July 17, 1978. The Commission d’Accès aux
Documents Administratifs manages the process.
29. Freedom of Information Act of England, Wales and Northern Ireland,
2000, c. 36 (U.K.). The U.K.’s Office of the Information Commissioner regulates
the implementation of the Freedom of Information Act and fulfills a proactive
obligation of research, education, and public awareness.

9
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compliance).30
These national laws typically reinforce the
public’s “right to know” subject to certain specified exceptions,
such as public safety, public health, and defense.
In terms of regional endeavors, Article 9(1) of the African
Charter on Human and People’s Rights of 1981 provides for the
right to information.31 In 2002, the African Commission on
Human and Peoples’ Rights, meeting at its thirty-second
Ordinary Session, in Banjul, Gambia, reinforced this right.32
Principle IV of the Declaration of Principles of Freedom of
Expression in African States declares: “Public bodies hold
information not for themselves but as custodians of the public
good and everyone has a right to access this information, subject
only to clearly defined rules established by law.”33
In the Americas, Article 13 of the American Convention on
Human Rights of 1969 incorporates the right to information
within provisions on the Freedom of Thought and Expression.34
More recently, on January 13, 2004, the heads of state and
government of the Americas adopted the Nuevo León Declaration.
The parties thereto declared, inter alia, that “access to
information held by the State, subject to constitutional and legal
norms, including those on privacy and confidentiality, is an
indispensable condition for citizen participation and promotes
effective respect for human rights.”35
In Europe, the 1950 European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms provides for the
freedom of expression. Article 10 of the Convention provides for a
qualified right. Article 10(1) incorporates a right to the “freedom
30. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006 & Supp. IV 2012) (the
Department of Justice’s Office of Information Policy oversees agency
compliance).
31. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520
U.N.T.S. 217.
32. See Resolution on the Adoption of the Declaration of Principles on
Freedom of Expression in Africa, Afr. Comm’n on Human & Peoples’ Rights, 32d
Sess., art. IV(1) (Oct.17-23, 2002).
33. Id.
34. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S.
123.
35. Declaration of Nuevo León Special Summit of the Americas Monterrey,
Mexico (Jan. 13, 2004), available at http://www.ftaa-alca.org/summits/mont
errey/nleon_e.asp.
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to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of
frontiers.”36 Article 10(2) conditions the right, in accordance with
laws that are
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 37

In 1970, the Council of Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly
adopted a declaration on mass communication media and human
rights. The Declaration establishes a European wide principle of
transparency and reinforces the right to information.38 The
Declaration provides, inter alia, that the right to freedom of
expression include “the freedom to seek, receive, impart, publish
and distribute information and ideas” and that “[t]here shall be a
corresponding duty for the public authorities to make available
information on matters of public interest within reasonable limits
. . . .”39 Europeans annexed another Declaration on the right of
access to information to the 1992 Treaty on European Union,
known as the Treaty of Maastricht.40
Further developments have also occurred at a treaty level.
The 2000 Treaty of Lisbon conferred on the European Union’s
Charter of Fundamental Rights the same value as a legally
binding treaty when it entered into force on December 1, 2009.41
The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
provides for the freedom of expression and information.42 Article
36. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, (entered into force
Sept. 3, 1953), available at http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/
html/005.htm.
37. Id.
38. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, Res. No. 428 (1970).
39. Id.
40. Treaty on European Union, 1992 O.J. (C 191).
41. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C
364).
42. Id.
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11 thereto stipulates, “Everyone has the right to freedom of
expression. This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and
to receive and impart information and ideas without interference
by public authority and regardless of frontiers.”43
Supplementary instruments are also relevant. In 2009, for
instance, the Council of Europe’s Convention on Access to Official
Documents was opened for member state signature, for accession
by non-member states, and for accession by any international
organization.44 The Convention on Access to Official Documents
provides for rights of access subject to certain limitations, such as
the necessity to protect national security, defense, and
international relations.45
The preceding instruments, many of which entail normative
guarantees of a right to information, demonstrate the nature of
objective equity. They illustrate the link between international
human rights and the right to information but they do not give
effect to equity in and of their own accord.
Balancing
contradistinctions between the relevancy and disciplines
governing the right to information is also needed to inform a
theory of justice for the global commons, collective human rights,
and rights for future generations included. Giving effect to the
right to information in international environmental law will also
inform governance of the right to information in climate law.
Before examining the nature of “effect” in more detail, the next
section places the right to information within the framework of
international environmental law.

43. Id. art. 11(1); Id. art. 11(2) (providing that the freedom and pluralism of
the media shall also be respected).
44. Directive of the European Parliament and Council 2003/4/EC, art. 2(1)(c),
2003 O.J. (L 41) 26-32.
45. Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents, CETS No.
205 (2009), available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/QueVoulez
Vous.asp?NT=205&CM=1&CL=ENG.
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B. International Environmental Law and the Right to
Information
1. To Give With One Hand . . .
Besides the framework context of international human rights
law, environmental law also informs the right to information in
international climate law. Parties to the Stockholm Declaration
declared specific non-state actor rights to information (Principle
19), and they strengthened their resolve to technology transfer
(Principle 20).46 Principles 10 and 19 of the 1992 Rio Declaration
reiterated and expanded on the Stockholm Declaration’s
provisions for the right to information by reinforcing individual
and public rights (Principle 10).47 Rio Principle 19 elaborates on
state responsibility to provide timely environmental notifications
and relevant environmental information.48
Adopted at the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (UNCED) in Rio, Section IV, Chapter 40, of
Agenda 21, entitled “Information for Decision-Making,” links the
relevancy of information to disciplining the application thereof.49
Agenda 21 grounded the right to information even further by
setting out a number of relevant core activities. Amongst others,
these actions include establishing a comprehensive information
framework. Giving effect to such a framework requires making
institutional changes at the national level, strengthening
environmental assessments, and strengthening the capacity for
traditional information and indigenous knowledge.50
Advocates for a World Charter for Nature were also coming
to the fore in the intervening periods between the Stockholm and
Rio Declarations. In essence, humankind advances by protecting

46. United Nation Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm,
Swed., June 5-16, 1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the
Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (June 16, 1972).
47. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de
Janeiro, Braz., June 3-14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I) (Aug. 12, 1992).
48. Id.
49. See id. Agenda 21 is a non-binding policy statement adopted at the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio.
50. Id. §§ 40.10, 40.11.
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and safeguarding nature’s qualities. In 1982, the General
Assembly proclaimed that “States and, to the extent they are
able, other public authorities, international organizations,
individuals, groups and corporations shall: co-operate in the task
of conserving nature through common activities and other
relevant actions, including information exchange and
consultations.”51
By 1994, there was evidence of a growing momentum to
recognize a formal link between the right to information in the
domain of human rights and the right to information in the
environmental domain. Attempts to discipline the right to
environmental information are featured in the 1994 Draft
Declaration of Principles on Human Rights and the
Environment.52 The 1994 Draft recognizes the link between
information, conduct, participation, and decision-making.53 A
further provision requires that, “information shall be timely,
clear, understandable and available without undue financial
burden to the applicant.”54
The intertwining of equitable rights as both human and
environmental rights was to continue throughout the ensuing
decade. In 2004, the Commission on Environmental Law of the
International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN)
presented a Draft International Covenant on Environment and
Development to the U.N. General Assembly.55
The Draft
Covenant contained several provisions on the right to
information.
For example, Article 45 thereto, entitled
“Information and Knowledge,” provides for the exchange of

51. World Charter for Nature, G.A. Res. 37/7, ¶ 21(a), U.N. GAOR, 37th
Sess., Supp. No. 51, U.N. Doc. A/RES/37/7 (Oct. 28, 1982).
52. U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, Final Report Prepared by Fatma Zohra Ksentini, Special
Rapporteur, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/9 (July 6, 1994).
53. See id.
54. Id. pt. III(15).
55. See IUCN Envtl. Law Programme, Comm’n on Envtl. Law of IUCNWorld Conservation Union, Draft International Covenant on Environment and
Development (Envtl. Policy & Law Paper No. 31, 3d ed. 2004), available at
http://home.moravian.edu/public/infocus/NEW/Resources/11-08-30_St.John_dra
ft_covenant.pdf.
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publically available information.56 In addition, the Covenant
requires the parties to obtain “prior informed consent” from local
communities before accessing traditional knowledge of indigenous
communities.57
The international community also made advances in
development crosscutting sectoral rights to environmental
information. As a result, equity and the inclusion of right to
information provisions in international treaties grew in
prominence. The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer (1987),58 the U.N.’s Convention to Combat
Desertification (1994),59 and the Convention on Biological
Diversity (1992),60 and its associated 2002 “Bonn Guidelines,”61
are symbolic of such headway.
At a regional level, the European Union’s Charter of
Fundamental Rights binds member states to integrate a “high
level of environmental protection and improvement of the quality
of the environment” into Union policies and ensure this obligation
in “accordance with the principle of sustainable development.”62
The U.N. Economic Commission for Europe’s (UNECE)
Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters
1998 (Aarhus Convention) establishes a European-wide right to
give effect to equity in environmental matters by encompassing

56. Id. art. 45.
57. Id.
58. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, art. 9,
Sept. 16, 1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 29 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989).
59. United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Countries
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa,
June 17, 1994, 1954 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 26, 1996).
60. See Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 17, June 5, 1992, 1760
U.N.T.S. 79.
61. See Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity,
The Hague, Neth., Apr. 7-19, 2002, Report of the Sixth Meeting of the Conference
of the Parties to the Convention of Biological Diversity, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20 (May 27, 2002).
62. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, supra note 41,
art. 37.
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provisions for access to information, public participation in
decision-making, and access to justice.63
Kofi Annan also identified with the broader context of
subjective equity. In speaking about the Aarhus Convention, the
former Secretary-General of the United Nations (1997-2006),
observed in 2000 that “[a]lthough regional in scope, the
significance of the Aarhus Convention is global. It is by far the
most impressive elaboration of principle 10 of the Rio
Declaration, which stresses the need for citizen’s participation in
environmental issues and for access to information on the
The Aarhus
environment held by public authorities.”64
Convention may have global significance but is it robust enough
to support a new architecture for third generation rights to
information and “people’s rights” to information, in international
climate law? This Article suggests that it may be robust enough
to facilitate a more universal architecture provided it situates
within an appropriate context: the constitutionalism of
international climate law needs to account for both objective and
subjective equitable thresholds.
To support implementation of the Aarhus Convention, the
UNECE has prepared a comprehensive set of guidelines.65 Three
supplementary
European
instruments
also
facilitate
implementation. Directive 2003/4/EC provides for access to
environmental information.66 Directive 2003/35/EC provides for
public participation in environmental programs.67 European
Commission Regulation (EC Regulation) 1367/2006, or the
“Aarhus Regulation,” extends EC Regulation No. 1049/2001 from
providing for general public access to European Parliament,
63. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in DecisionMaking and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, June 25, 1998, 2161
U.N.T.S. 447 [hereinafter Aarhus Convention].
64. U.N. Econ. Comm’n for Eur., The Aarhus Convention: An Implementation
Guide, at v, U.N. Doc. ECE/CEP/72, U.N. Sales No. E.00.II.E.3 (2000).
65. See id.
66. Directive of the European Parliament and Council 2003/4/EC, 2003 O.J.
(L 41) 26.
67. Directive of the European Parliament and Council 2003/35/EC, Providing
for Public Participation in Respect of the Drawing Up of Certain Plans and
Programmes Relating to the Environment and Amending with Regard to Public
Participation and Access to Justice Council Directives 85/337/EEC and
96/61/EC, 2003 O.J. (L 156) 17.
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Council, and Commission documents and principles, and limits
governing access thereto, to provisions regulating public access to
information on environmental matters held by all community
institutions and bodies.68 The Aarhus Regulation requires that
community institutions and bodies provide for public
participation in the preparation, modification, or review of “plans
and programmes relating to the environment.”69 It also enables
certified non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to request an
internal review.70
The “European Transparency Initiative,” launched on
November 9, 2005, also supplements de jure rights to
information. The European Transparency Initiative disciplines
three aspects of the right to information: transparency and
interest representation, minimum standards for consultation, and
publication of data on beneficiaries of EU Funds.71 The initiative
includes a review of EC Regulation No. 1049/2001 concerning
general public access to specified institutions.72 However, in
interpreting Europe’s transparency policy in environmental law,
the Aarhus Regulation (EC Regulation 1367/2006) shall prevail in
case of divergence.
In terms of disciplining the right to information, the Aarhus
Convention contains provisions for integrity, transparency, and
government accountability.73 While the Aarhus Convention
collates provisions on information, transparency, and
accountability as already considered by international treaties—
such as those aforementioned thresholds of subjective equity
governing ozone depletion, desertification, and biodiversity—it

68. Commission Regulation 1367/2006, 2006 O.J. (L 264) 13, 14 (EC); see also
Commission Regulation 1049/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 145) 43 (EU); Commission
Decision 2008/50/EC, 2007 O.J. (L 13) 16; Commission Decision 2008/401/EC,
2008 O.J. (L 140) 30.
69. Commission Regulation 1367/2006, 2006 O.J. (L 264) 13, 14.
70. Id. at 15.
71. Comm’n of the European Communities, Green Paper: European
Transparency Initiative 3-4 (2006).
72. Comm’n of the European Communities, Green Paper: Public Access to
Documents Held by Institutions of the European Community 3 (2007).
73. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63.
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builds on those provisions by incorporating several important
modernizations.74
As aforementioned, the parties to the Aarhus Convention
acknowledge three main pillars that guarantee the objectivity of
effective justice.
In order to contribute to the protection of the right of every
person of present and future generations to live in an
environment adequate to his or her health and well-being, each
Party shall guarantee the rights of access to information, public
participation in decision-making, and access to justice in
environmental matters in accordance with the provisions of this
Convention.75

Upholding the integrity of these three pillars is fundamental to
fulfill equity in its subjective context.
The Aarhus Convention’s implementing apparatus reinforces
its recognition of access to information as a fundamental right.
In 2008, at the third meeting of the parties to the Aarhus
Convention, which culminated in the adoption of the Riga
Declaration, the parties thereto elaborated on this fundamental
right declaring:
Public access to information, as well as being a right in itself, is
essential for meaningful public participation and access to
justice. When properly implemented, the right to information
leads on the one hand to more transparent, accountable
government and on the other to a more informed,
environmentally aware public. 76

In essence, conduct that gives effect to the Aarhus
Convention’s right to information is two-fold. First, there is an
obligation on public authorities to respond to information
74. See id.
75. Id. art. 1.
76. Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in DecisionMaking and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, Riga, Lat., June 11-13,
2008, Report of the Third Meeting of the Parties-Addendum to Riga Declaration,
§ 9, ECE/MP.PP/2008/2/Add.1 (Sept. 26, 2008) [hereinafter Addendum to Riga
Declaration]; see also Svitlana Kravchenko, The Aarhus Convention and
Innovations in Compliance with Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 18
COLO. J. INT’L ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 1 (2007).
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requests.77 Second, there is an obligation on the parties to collect
and disseminate accurate environmental information.78
The first obligation entails a responsive or reactive obligation
on public authorities whereby external stakeholders are typically,
but not always, the initiator of the request. Reactive obligations
contrast with passive obligations insofar that they require some
level of engagement with the actor initiating the request and a
visible reaction that produces results. The second obligation
entails an anticipatory or proactive obligation on public
authorities whereby public authorities are typically, but not
always, the initiator of the inquiry.
As such, the second
obligation facilitates the way for public authorities to control and
manage their climate change mandate instead of responding on
an ad hoc basis to an influx of requests.
In assessing this mix of reactive and proactive obligations,
and as a forerunner for meaningful public participation and
access to justice, it is useful to examine the relevancy and
disciplines governing environmental information. The analysis
proceeds by assessing the parameters of “environmental
information.” It also examines the degree to which public
authorities honor their proactive and reactive obligations in
practice. In other words, it applies a subjective test.
The definition of “environmental information” establishes the
parameters of the “environmental information” in question.
Within the “Aarhus” context, “environmental information” means
any information in written, visual, aural, electronic or any other
material form on:
(a) The state of elements of the environment, such as air and
atmosphere, water . . .;
(b) Factors, such as substances, energy, noise and radiation, and
activities or measures, including administrative measures,
environmental agreements, policies, legislation, plans and
programmes, affecting or likely to affect the elements of the
environment within the scope of subparagraph (a) above, and

77. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, art. 4.
78. Id. art. 5.
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cost-benefit and other economic analyses and assumptions used
in environmental decision-making;
(c) The state of human health and safety, conditions of human
life, cultural sites and built structures, inasmuch as they are or
may be affected by the state of the elements of the environment
or, through these elements, by the factors, activities or measures
referred to in subparagraph (b) above.79

Subject to expressing justification for a delay due to the
complexity of the subject, the main rule in terms of responding to
requests for environmental information is that a public authority
must provide environmental information to the applicant within
one month of the submission of the request.80 Public authorities
may refuse to provide the requested environmental information
if, amongst others, they do not hold the information requested; if
the request is manifestly unreasonable or too general; due to a
certain number of public interest, national defense or public
security exceptions; due to a breach of personal confidentiality
laws; or, due to breaches of intellectual property rights.81 In the
event of not meeting the request, the public authority is obliged to
inform the applicant of where the applicant may obtain the
relevant information or the rationale for refusal.82
To recall, collection and dissemination of data that will
inform citizens of their rights is an anticipatory obligation
intrinsic to the Aarhus Convention.83 Each party thereto is to
ensure that “public authorities possess and update environmental
information which is relevant to their functions.”84 There is a
duty on the parties to provide a rapid alert system in response to
environmental information that may adversely affect the
environment or human health.
Another advantage of the Aarhus Convention is that it
provides for a far more streamlined “ease of use” policy. Parties
are encouraged to make use of electronic databases and publish
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, art. 2(3).
Id. art. 4(2).
Id. art. 4(3)-(4).
Id. art. 4(5).
Id. art. 5.
Id. art. 5(1)(a).
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information online.85 The Riga Declaration (2008) recognizes
that “[e]lectronic tools have dramatically increased the
possibilities for putting environmental information in the public
domain, but their potential has yet to be fully realized.”86
These reactive and proactive obligations are not, however,
isolated to state parties. Liability under the Aarhus Convention
for the collection and dissemination of information and response
to requests of course resides with the contracting parties.
Notwithstanding, the Convention provides indirect rights of
access for non-state actors. After all, non-state actors may have a
significant impact on the environment. For instance, if an
“operator’s” “activities” “have a significant impact on the
environment,” then the contracting party is obligated to
encourage those operators “to inform the public regularly of the
environmental impact of their activities and products, where
appropriate within the framework of voluntary eco-labelling or
eco-auditing schemes or by other means.”87
While not defining the term “operator,” the Convention is
flexible enough to extend beyond state-to-state responsibility by
encompassing guidelines for other actors in a state to non-state
relation. As a result, activities of a non-state party may invoke
responsibility on the contracting party via instruments, such as
environmental impact assessments. To quote Sands,
[A]n environmental impact assessment describes a process which
produces a written statement to be used to guide decisionmaking, with several related functions. First, it should provide
decision-makers with information on the environmental
consequences of proposed activities and, in some cases,
programmes and policies, and their alternatives. Secondly, it
requires decisions to be influenced by that information. And,
thirdly, it provides a mechanism for ensuring the participation of
potentially affected persons in the decision-making process.88

85. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, art. 5(3).
86. Addendum to Riga Declaration, supra note 76, § 10.
87. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, art. 5(6).
88. PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 800
(2d ed. 2003).
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These interactions support and strengthen shared responsibility.
By linking the right to environmental information to
environmental impact assessments, the Aarhus Convention
supports this interpretation within its objective context (as a type
of substantive guarantee) and subjectively (if conduct is timely
and gives effect to normative guarantees).
Even if the proposed objective element of equity is right, the
maxim donner et retenir ne vaut suggests that the norm may still
not be valid. In certain circumstances equity may not be put into
effect. In addition, and especially concerning the birthright of
future generations, there needs to be some sort of safeguard to
ensure that competent authorities issuing a legal norm do not
take back what is given if there is later a regret, or if the
relationship between the parties changes. Similarly, if competent
authorities never make the legal norm effective then the outcome
is precisely one of not validating the legal norm. One has given
with one hand and taken away with the other.
2. . . . And to Take Away With the Other
A certain number of lessons drawn from the European
context may perhaps be useful for developing an effective and
universal right to information within the global commons, and,
more precisely, within the constitutionalism of international
climate law. In returning to Europe, it was somewhat doubtful
prior to the Aarhus Convention (1998) whether Article 10 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (1950) was a successful mechanism for
disciplining the right to environmental information by the
enforcement of proactive and reactive obligations. In application,
the European Court of Human Rights seemed to distinguish
between positive and negative rights. (To recall, a positive right
obliges action and a negative right obliges curtail of an action).
It is important to make a distinction, however, between the
framework that governs proactive and reactive obligations and
that which governs positive and negative rights. To exhibit the
practicalities of the “willingness and capacity” to discipline
information for effective justice, insofar as a subjective test is
concerned, this subsection will reference several cases of the
European Court of Human Rights concerning environmental law.
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Examples show that European jurisprudence is yet to harness a
consistent recognition of proactive and reactive obligations
regarding the right to information.
Bladet Tromsø & Stensaas v. Norway (Eur. Ct. H.R. 1999) is
a case in point.89 In Bladet Tromsø, the issue was whether the
press should have the freedom of expression to publish a report
commissioned by Norway’s Ministry of Fisheries on seal hunting
or whether the protection of a seal hunter’s reputation should be
Norway mooted that the
the prevailing consideration.90
protection of seal hunters’ reputation should prevail.91 Whereas,
the press considered that their interests and those of the seals
were paramount.92
While recognizing that the debate was of public interest, the
Norwegian government claimed that the press launched the
report in question in a sensationalist way. The government
claimed that the press aimed to launch a personal attack against
the hunters.93 One famous headline even read, “Shock report . . .
Seals skinned alive.”94 Norway was of the view that Article 10 of
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (1950), which provides for freedom of
expression, should not extend to the degree of harming human
livelihoods and private individuals.95 The press leaned on animal
right’s interests, the public’s right to know, and a duty to
disclose.96
In deciding the case, the European Court of Human Rights
turned to the test of “necessity in a democratic society.”97 The
Court remarked thus:
[W]hilst the mass media must not overstep the bounds imposed
in the interests of the protection of the reputation of private

89. Bladet Tromsø & Stensaas v. Norway, App. No. 21980/93, 29 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 125 (2000).
90. See generally id.
91. Id. at 128.
92. See generally id.
93. Id. at 165.
94. Id. at 134.
95. Id. at 153.
96. Id. at 167.
97. Bladet Tromsø, App. No. 21980/93, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 125.
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individuals, it is incumbent on them to impart information and
ideas concerning matters of public interest. Not only does the
press have the task of imparting such information and ideas; the
public also has a right to receive them.98

Public interest was vital to ensure an informed public debate
locally, nationally, and internationally, and trumped protecting
the seal hunter’s interests and their respective reputations. By
extension, the European Court of Human Rights held that there
had been a violation of Article 10 of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,99
and that the public had a right to be aware and informed of the
report commissioned by Norway’s Ministry of Fisheries on seal
hunting. In these circumstances, the Norwegian government
could not invoke a negative right to curtail action by silencing the
press and prohibiting publication. Further, there was no reactive
(responsive) obligation on the government to inform. As to the
press, however, a positive right was invoked obliging action, and
a proactive (anticipatory) obligation was invoked on the mass
media to collect and disseminate information. There was a
positive right and proactive obligation incumbent on the press to
inform.
Environmental information and Article 10 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms had come under scrutiny by the European Court of
Human Rights a year earlier. One may consider two relevant
questions extracted from the 1998 Guerra & Others v. Italy
dispute.100 As a reactive (responsive) obligation, should public
authorities respond to citizens’ requests for information about the
potential hazards of living near a high-risk fertilizer factory that
released harmful toxins into the air and was prone to accidents?
As a proactive (anticipatory) obligation, should public authorities
inform local residents about the consequences of living near the
factory? As both obligations would oblige action, they reflect the
procedural enforcement of a positive right.

98. Id. at 126-27.
99. Id. at 130.
100. Guerra & Others v. Italy, App. No. 14967/89, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 357 (1998).
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It was known through reports “that the emission treatment
equipment was inadequate and the environmental-impact
assessment incomplete.”101 Further, there was a record of prior
accidents. To recall, on one occasion several tons of potassium
carbonate and bicarbonate solution, containing arsenic trioxide,
escaped into the atmosphere resulting in the hospitalization of
150 people with acute arsenic poisoning.102 Did this ‘know-how’
invoke an extended proactive obligation on public authorities to
inform about the “state of elements of the environment” following
such disaster? Now, this question is somewhat complex because
it invokes both anticipatory and responsive elements, i.e. action
in anticipation of a future disaster and action in response to a
preceding disaster.
“In circumstances such as those of the present case,”103 did
the local population have a right to be informed about the risk
factors, the factors affecting or likely to affect the elements of the
environment, and to be advised as to what to do in the event of
future accidents? Did the public have the right to be informed
about the state of human health and safety?
Public authorities were not proactive.
There was no
anticipatory action taken by the government to collect and
disseminate information. There was therefore no action to inform
the public.
Citizens were proactive. They requested information from
the relevant public authorities about the risks of future disasters.
Citizens thereby claimed a reactive obligation on public
authorities to respond. The relevant public authorities refused
the information requests.
Two questions delimiting proactive and reactive obligations
come to bear. First, could the right for citizens to know ever
invoke a reactive (responsive) obligation, and thereby a test of
“necessity in a democratic society,” say, in the interests of public
safety, in the interests of protecting human health, or in the
interests of preventing a severe disruption to the functioning of a
local community? Second, could the right to know ever invoke a

101. Id. at 363.
102. Id. at 362.
103. Id. at 359.
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proactive (anticipatory) obligation on public authorities to impart
information, and thereby a second test of “necessity in a
democratic society,” say, in the interests of public safety,
protecting human health, or preventing a severe disruption to the
functioning of a local community?
The Court did not entertain such a complete analysis of
Article 10’s rights and responsibilities. If it had, however, would
the outcome have differed? In the alternative, and being more
forward looking, could the Court see an evolution in the
interpretation and application of Article 10 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms that will strengthen citizenship rights and society’s
interests?
To answer these questions there is a need for further
examination. Consider the duties and responsibilities on the
right to information as provided for by the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
Article 10 of the Convention provides for the “Freedom of
expression” as follows:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right
shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart
information and ideas without interference by public authority
and regardless of frontiers.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties
and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities,
conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and
are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 104

Now, compare the insights that one may draw from the
actual findings of the Court. In terms of the merits of an Article

104. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 36, art. 10.
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10 violation, the European Court of Human Rights held in Guerra
& Others v Italy that
[f]reedom to receive information basically prohibited a
government from restricting a person from receiving information
that others wished or might be willing to impart to him - that
freedom could not be construed as imposing on a State, in
circumstances such as those of present case, positive obligations
to collect and disseminate information of its own motion. 105

There was therefore no violation of Article 10. The Court
invoked a negative right that curtails governments from
restricting the receipt of information from third parties. In
addition, the Court revoked any positive right in circumstances
such as those of the present case that construes a proactive
(anticipatory) obligation on governments to collect and
disseminate information. Only a breach of reactive (responsive)
obligations in terms of a third party duty to respond could invoke
a breach of Article 10. The public had a right to receive
information, but the government had no corresponding obligation
by which to discharge that right.
It may be recalled of Bladet Tromsø, the “seal hunters” case,
that the press was imputed with a positive proactive obligation to
“impart information and ideas” about animal health to which the
public had a right of receipt; and, the government was imputed
with a negative charge of non-interference.106 There was no
positive charge and no proactive (anticipatory) obligation on the
government to inform of its own motion. Similarly, in Guerra, the
public had a right to receive information, but the government had
no positive charge and no proactive obligation to impart
information about the risks to human health and the mitigation
of risk.
Extending one party a right of receipt but not obliging the
other to give effect to that right may undermine the credibility of
European human rights and even the development of such rights

105. Guerra, App. No. 14967/8926, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 359.
106. Bladet Tromsø & Stensaas v. Norway, App. No. 21980/93, 29 Eur.
Ct. H.R. 125, 168 (2000).
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in international law.107 In both European cases human rights to
information existed, but they did not oblige the competent
authorities to enforce a right to information. Human rights to
know did not invoke a duty to disclose.
While Article 10 reinforced provisions of objective equity, the
consequences of weak subjective equity led to other corollaries.
Another important argument in Guerra recalled the Council of
Europe’s Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1087 on the
consequences of the Chernobyl disaster.108 Adopted on April 26,
1996, Resolution 1087 states, “public access to clear and full
information . . . must be viewed as a basic human right.”109 The
counter-argument was that Resolution 1087 and Directive
90/313/EEC of the Council of the European Communities on the
freedom of access to information on the environment
spoke merely of access, not a right, to information. If a positive
obligation to provide information existed, it would be “extremely
difficult to implement” because of the need to determine how and
when the information was to be disclosed, which authorities were
responsible for disclosing it and who was to receive it. 110

These are precisely the issues that advances in subjective equity
ought to try to address. On its own, an objective test of equity
does not guarantee justice.
Some may argue that the Aarhus Convention should rectify
these deficiencies. This may be true in certain circumstances.
While the European Court of Human Rights in Guerra dismissed
an obligation on public authorities to respond to information
requests,111 and was adamant that there was no proactive
(anticipatory) obligation on public authorities to collect and
disseminate accurate environmental information,112 the Aarhus
107. See U.N. Int’l L. Comm’n, Protection of Persons in Event of Disasters: Text
of Draft Articles 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 as Provisionally Adopted by the Drafting
Committee, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/L.758 (July 24, 2009) (assigning a duty for States
and intergovernmental organizations to respect persons’ rights while assisting
after a disaster).
108. Guerra, App. No. 14967/8926, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 367.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 381.
111. Id. at 359.
112. Id.
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Convention was not invoked. It did not apply at that time.
Guerra was a 1998 case and the Aarhus Convention did not enter
into force until October 30, 2001.113
Although an Article 10, Freedom of Expression, provision
could not invoke proactive (anticipatory) obligations for a state’s
public apparatus to impart information “of its own motion,” the
European Court of Human Rights considered that there might be
positive obligations inherent in Article 8 of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedom.114 Article 8 provides for respect to private and family
life.115 Concluding in Guerra, the Court held that the Italian
authorities had failed in their positive obligations to secure
respect for the applicants’ private and family life and, by
extension, violated Article 8 (but not Article 10).116 The Court
thereby found that there was an indirect right to information
albeit within an Article 8 argument.117
Is the finding in Guerra an isolated instance or could it be
said that Article 8 now encompasses an indirect right to
information? Moreover, what other human rights provisions in
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms incorporate an indirect right to
information or do all articles incorporate an indirect right to
information? Consequently, is subjective equity a universal
human right? The following section will start to assess the
potential answers to these questions.
3. Donner et Retenir ne Vaut
Under scrutiny, several other cases of the European Court of
Human Rights evoke the same line of reasoning as that found in
Guerra & Others v. Italy. McGinley & Egan v. United Kingdom
(1998) illuminates the subject. The findings in McGinley pivot on
113. Jeremy Wates, Aarhus Convention Starts Count-Down to Entry Into
Force, U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR., Aug. 9, 2001, http://www.unece.org/press/pr
2001/01env06e.html.
114. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 36, art. 8, 10.
115. Id.
116. Guerra, App. No. 14967/8926, Eur. Ct. H.R. 357 at 360.
117. Id.
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the United Kingdom’s Christmas Island nuclear tests and the
right of allegedly afflicted service personnel to the full benefit of
government services thereafter.118 Here too, the Court decided in
terms of applicability that Article 8 of the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(the right to respect private and family lives) embodied a right to
information, but not necessarily a proactive (anticipatory)
obligation on the government to fulfill that right.119
In unraveling this finding, recall that “[b]etween 1952 and
1967 the United Kingdom carried out a number of atmospheric
tests of nuclear weapons in the Pacific Ocean and at Maralinga,
Australia, involving over 20,000 servicemen.”120 A number of
service personnel suffered dire health consequences subsequent
to the tests.121 Whether or not they would have suffered the
same health effects if they had not participated in the tests is
moot. In any event, the servicemen believed that they were
entitled to receive government support.122
To give effect to their claim the servicemen sought
information about the possible connections between the nuclear
tests, human health, and their right to government services.123
For the U.K. government, no such right was admissible unless a
correct procedure was followed.124 The servicemen struggled to
work their way through the administrative process.125 In this
regard, a distinction must be made about the objective content (of
the information or procedure) and the conduct (that which would
fulfill or give effect to the intended object or purpose).
The Court found that the U.K. government had provided a
procedure by which the servicemen could access documents
118. McGinley & Egan v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 218725/93, 23414/94, 27
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 7-12 (1999) (revised on Jan. 28, 2000).
119. Id. at 44.
120. McGinley, App. Nos. 218725/93, 23414/94, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 5.
121. Roff, S.R., Mortality and Morbidity of Members of the British Nuclear
Tests Veterans Association and the New Zealand Nuclear Tests Veterans
Association and Their Families, MED., CONFLICT, & SURVIVAL, July – Sept. 1999,
at 1-51.
122. McGinley, App. Nos. 218725/93, 23414/94, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 49.
123. Id. at 1.
124. Id. at 4.
125. Id.
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relevant to the tests.126 An objective test was met. As a result,
there was no requirement for the U.K. to answer to the claim of a
violation of Article 8 of the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.127 The
procedure may have been relevant, but there was no discipline as
to ease of use or timeliness.128
The finding in McGinley & Egan v. United Kingdom is not
the same as saying that there was a positive obligation on the
U.K. to avail servicemen of information pertaining to the health
consequences of their participation in nuclear tests. Not everyone
asserted this view.129 Judges De Meyer, Valticos, and Morenilla
dissented.130 In their joint dissenting opinion the three judges
opined that following what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki
in August 1945 that no one could have any doubt that nuclear
weapons were capable of causing long-term health implications
and even death.131
Back in 1998, the dissenting judges in McGinley referred to a
report issued before the nuclear tests in question: “[A] note
entitled ‘Radiological Safety Regulations, Christmas Island’ of
March 1958 [stated] that ‘the danger is insidious because the
effects are not felt immediately and the damage may only become
apparent after several years.’”132 Judges De Meyer, Valticos, and
Morenilla opined that there was a positive right, and an
obligation on the British state “to assume their responsibilities
towards the people present in the test areas when the explosions
took place” without the applicants having to ask.133 Such a
presumption of responsibility would have equated to the
invocation of a proactive (anticipatory) obligation.
McGinley, Guerra, and Bladet Tromsø were all decided before
the Aarhus Convention entered into force on October 30, 2001.
The Aarhus Convention does not explicitly mention the European

126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

McGinley, App. Nos. 218725/93, 23414/94, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 46.
Id.
Id.
McGinley, App. Nos. 218725/93, 23414/94, 27 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 47.
Id.
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Court of Human Rights as a dispute resolution body.134 Even so,
the question remains as to whether after October 30, 2001, the
Aarhus Convention demonstrates to be such an impressive
elaboration of the right to information. Developing and applying
a framework for such analysis may assist with the answer.
A potential framework evokes three key issues. First, in
embodying a lex specialis regime of equitable rights, does the
Aarhus Convention isolate dispute resolution to mechanisms
provided for by the Aarhus Convention? Second, has the entry
into force of the Aarhus Convention reinforced Article 10 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (Freedom of Expression and the Right to
Information)? Or, does Article 8 (Respect for Private and Family
Life) still incorporate the prevailing provisions on the right to
information? Third, do parties to the Aarhus Convention, and the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, recognize the scope of the Aarhus
Convention to facilitate a framework for invoking direct
provisions for the subjective test of equitable rights in European
Human Rights cases? In other words, what are the linkages
between the Aarhus Convention and the European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;
and, moreover, does the Aarhus Convention reinforce
interpretation of the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms?
In turning to the Aarhus Convention, Article 16 thereto
provides for the Settlement of Disputes between the Parties.135
The Parties to the Aarhus Convention “shall seek a solution by
negotiation or by any other means of dispute settlement.”136 If
resolution is not possible by these means, the Parties agree to
“one or both of the following means of dispute settlement: i)
submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice”;
or, ii) arbitration constituted under the Aarhus Convention’s
rules of procedure.137

134.
135.
136.
137.

Aarhus Convention, supra note 63.
Id. art. 16.
Id.
Id.
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To recall, by signing and ratifying the Aarhus Convention,
the European Community agreed to be subject to its terms, which
included provisions for dispute settlement.138 “In accordance
with the Treaty establishing the European Community, and in
particular Article 175(1) thereof, the European Community is
competent for entering into international agreements, and for
The
implementing the obligations resulting therefrom.”139
Aarhus Convention is therefore part of EU law and binding on
the European Community, its institutions that fall within the
competence of the Convention, and its Member States.140
There is recent case law on this interpretation. In Stichting
Natuur en Milieu & Pesticide Action Network Europe v. European
Commission (2012) and Vereniging Milieudefensie & Stichting
Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht v. European Commission
(2012), the European Court of Justice found that “the Aarhus
Convention was signed by the European Community and
subsequently approved by Council Decision 2005/370/EC of 17
February 2005 (OJ 2005 L 124, p. 1). The institutions are
accordingly bound by that convention, which prevails over
secondary Community legislation.”141
By extension, the three pillars of the Aarhus Convention—
the right to information, public participation, and access to
justice—are also binding.142 The Aarhus Convention has a
different place in EU law than regulations and directives. The

138. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63; see also Aarhus: What is the EU
Doing?, EUR. ENVTL. BUREAU, http://www.eeb.org/index.cfm/activities/governan
ce-tools/aarhus/aarhus-what-is-the-eu-doing/ (last visited Nov. 9, 2012). The
European Community signed the Aarhus Convention on June. 25, 1998 and
ratified it on Feb. 17, 2005. Id.
139. The Decision on conclusion of the Aarhus Convention was adopted by the
EC on February 17, 2005. Council Decision 2005/370, 2005 O.J. (L 124) 1 (EC);
see also Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, art. 2(2)(d).
140. See Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, art. 216(2), Mar.
25, 1957, 2010 O.J. 53, 83.
141. Case T-338/08, Stichting Natuur en Milieu & Pesticide Action Network
Europe v. Comm’n, 2012 E.C.R. at para. 52; Case T-396/09, Vereniging
Milieudefensie & Stichting Stop Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht v. Comm’n, 2012
E.C.R. II-00246, at para. 52.
142. See Case C-239/03, Comm’n v. France, 2004 E.C.R. I-09325
(demonstrating where the provisions of a Convention and Protocol concluded by
the EU created rights and obligations on Member States).

33

2012]

RIGHT TO KNOW AND DUTY TO DISCLOSE

173

Convention trumps regulations and directives. “It follows that
the validity of a measure of secondary Community legislation
may be affected by the fact that it is incompatible with the
Aarhus Convention.”143
(Regulations and directives are binding sources of secondary
legislation.144 Regulations are directly applicable and binding in
their entirety.145 Member States have a degree of flexibility as to
the choice and form of transposing directives and directives are
applicable as to the result to be achieved).146
EU law—primary legislation, secondary legislation, and case
law—thereby needs to be interpreted in the light of the Aarhus
Convention. The decisions are consistent with earlier findings.
In consideration of environmental directives, the European Court
of Justice found in Commission v. Ireland that, by merely
publishing the procedures on the internet, Ireland had not
fulfilled its obligations to inform the public in a sufficiently clear
and precise manner about access to judicial review procedures in
environmental matters.147
If there is a contradiction in the interpretation of laws
between national laws and the Aarhus Convention, then the
Aarhus Convention prevails.148 If there is contradiction between
EU law, such as the European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Aarhus
Convention, then there may be normative invalidity but this is
unlikely. A solution ought to be found that is compatible with
both conventions. For clarity, subject to ubiquitous provisions of
general international law, e.g. good faith, the general provisions
of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights

143. Case T-396/09, Vereniging Milieudefensie & Stichting Stop
Luchtverontreiniging Utrecht v. Comm’n, 2012 E.C.R. at para. 52.
144. Decision-Making in the European Union, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa
.eu/about-eu/basic-information/decision-making/index_en.htm (last visited Nov.
1, 2012).
145. Regulations, Directives, and Other Acts, EUROPEAN UNION, http://europa
.eu/about-eu/basic-information/decision-making/legal-acts/index_en.htm
(last
visited Nov. 1, 2012).
146. Id.
147. Case C-427/07, Comm’n v. Ireland, 2009 E.C.R. I-6277.
148. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, art. 19(4).
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and Fundamental Freedoms may be interpreted according to the
more specific provisions provided for by the Aarhus Convention.
If the contracting party to the Aarhus Convention is not a
member of the EU, then the provisions of Article 16 of the Aarhus
Convention will still provide for the settlement of disputes
between the parties thereto.149 The UNECE website provides
further details of relevant jurisprudence in its database on
Aarhus Judgments.150 Jurisprudence of the European Court on
Human Rights provides some useful guidance and the Article
refers to a number of relevant cases in the analysis that follows.
In Öneryıldız v. Turkey, the European Court of Human
Rights rightly isolated consideration of the right to information to
the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms. (Turkey was not a member to the Aarhus Convention
at that time).151
Öneryıldız disputed the question of
responsibility for harm arising from a methane explosion. Thirtynine people died when refuse engulfed inhabitants living in a
Turkish slum on the edge of a rubbish tip following the
explosion.152
In reference to the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms, the Court found a violation of the
right to life (enshrined in Article 2), a violation of the right to
peaceful enjoyment of possessions (Article 1 of Protocol number
1), and a violation of a right to a domestic remedy (Article 13).153
Having regard to these findings, the Court did not consider it
necessary to examine the allegations of a violation of the right to
a fair trial (Article 6, section 1) or the right to respect for private
and family life (Article 8). The Grand Chamber of the Court
agreed that the right to information had already been recognized

149. Id. art. 16(1).
150. U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR., http://www.unece.org (last visited Feb. 14,
2012).
151. Georges-Stavros Kremlis, The Aarhus Convention and Its Implementation
in the European Community, in SEVENTH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON
ENVIRONMENTAL COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 141 (Jo Gerardu at al. eds.,
2005), available at http://inece.org/conference/7/vol1/22_Kremlis.pdf.
152. Öneryıldız v. Turkey, App. No. 48939/99, 41 Eur. Ct. H.R. 20, 34 (2005).
153. Id. at 80.
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under Article 2 and, in principle, may be relied on for the
protection of the right to life.154
Roche v. United Kingdom (a case of October 19, 2005)
considered the claim of another serviceman who incurred health
injuries arising from weapons’ testing.155 This time around,
servicemen participating in the United Kingdom’s testing of
chemical weapons allegedly sustained injuries from notorious
mustard nerve gas tests.156 The United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland signed the Aarhus Convention on
June 25, 1998 and, according to the U.N. Treaty Collection,
ratified it on February 23, 2005.157 At the time of the case the
U.K. was therefore a member of the EU and a party to the
Aarhus Convention.
Analogous to what happened in McGinley, the U.K.
government had refused to provide the injured applicants with a
service pension.158 Again, the European Court of Human Rights
linked the right to information to Article 8 of the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms; but
not to Article 10 or the lex specialis Aarhus regime.159 The
judgment in McGinley states the Court considered that the
United Kingdom had not fulfilled its positive obligation to provide
an effective and accessible procedure enabling the applicant to
have access to all relevant and appropriate information, which
would allow him to assess any risk to which he had been exposed
during his participation in the tests. There had therefore been a
violation of Article 8.160

154. Id.
155. Roche v. United Kingdom, App. No. 32555/96, 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 30, 33
(2006).
156. Id.
157. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, at 447; see also Archive: Aarhus
Convention on Environmental Diplomacy, DEP’T FOR ENV’T FOOD & RURAL
AFFAIRS,
http://archive.defra.gov.uk/environment/policy/international/aarhus/
index.htm (last updated Nov. 26, 2009).
158. Roche v. United Kingdom, App. No. 32555/96, 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 30, 38
(2006).
159. Id. at 82.
160. McGinley & Egan v. United Kingdom, App. Nos. 218725/93, 23414/94, 27
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 7-12 (1999).
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In the Court’s view Article 10 was a de jure right but could
not impose a positive obligation on the state to disseminate
information (donner et retenir ne vaut).161 There had been no
interference with the applicant’s right to information as provided
There was therefore no
for by virtue of Article 10.162
consideration of the Aarhus Convention although it was a highly
relevant instrument of EU law. Another perspective is that the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms was sufficient to establish the finding.
In a more recent case, Tatar v. Romania aired a dispute
relating to pollution and public health hazards resulting from the
release of toxic sodium cyanide as part of a gold extraction
Romania entered the EU in 2007 but it had
process.163
independently signed the Aarhus Convention on June 25, 1998
and ratified it on July 11, 2000.164 Romania ratified the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms in 1994.165
The Court opined in Tatar v. Romania that public authorities
had to ensure public access to environmental investigations and
impact assessment studies.166
The Romanian Government
continued to refrain from providing information even after an
accident in 2000 resulted in the release of large quantities of
cyanide into the environment.167 Industrial operations continued
in violation of the precautionary principle.168 Still, the European
Court of Human Rights held that the violation of the right to
information did not encapsulate an Article 10 violation.169

161. Roche, App. No. 32555/96, 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 79.
162. Id.
163. Tatar v. Romania, App. No. 67021/01, 115 Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009).
164. Romania, PUB. PARTICIPATION CAMPAIGN, http://www.participate.org/
index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=134:romania&catid=51:countr
ies&Itemid=121 (last visited Nov. 17, 2012).
165. Romania: Treaties Signed and Ratified Or having been the Subject of an
Accession as of 18/11/2012, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://conventions.coe.int/
Treaty/Commun/ListeTraites.asp?PO=ROM&MA=999&SI=2&DF=&CM=3&CL
=ENG (last visited Nov. 17, 2012).
166. Tatar, App. No. 67021/01, 115 Eur. Ct. H.R at 11.
167. Id. at 2.
168. Id. at 4.
169. Id. at 7.
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Instead, the breach of a right to information was embodied in an
Article 8 violation. Respect for a person’s private and family life
was paramount.170
If Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights
and Fundamental Freedoms encapsulates a right to information,
exactly when and where do Article 10 violations occur; or, are
Article 10 rights given with one hand and taken away with the
other (donner et retenir ne vaut)? Violations of Article 10 often
seem restricted to striking a balance between non-state actors,
such as journalists and authors,171 rights of expression vis-a-vis
crossing a threshold into defamation or libel.172 Sample cases
include regulating the choice of the medium for expression, e.g.
broadcasting173 and the expression of political views.174 These
applications differ to extending Article 10 to the duties and
responsibilities of public authorities to receive and impart
information.
Europe’s tendency to shy away from a fundamental right to
information that incorporates positive obligations on public
authorities is not necessarily encountered elsewhere. The InterAmerican case of Claude Reyes & Others v. Chile illustrates an
alternative approach.175 In 2006, the Inter-American Court of

170. Id. at 19.
171. Editions Plon v. France, App. No. 58148/00, 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 36 (2006)
(explaining that in Kenedi v. Hungary, the Court did find a violation of art. 10
(freedom of expression) when a historian was refused access to documents
concerning Hungary’s communist epoch); Fressoz & Roire v. France, App. No.
29183/95, 31 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2 (2001); Jersild v. Denmark, App. No. 15890/89, 19
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (1995) (violation of journalists’ and author’s freedom of
expression).
172. Gorelishvili v. Georgia, App. No. 12979/04, 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. 36 (2009);
Lopes Gomes Da Silva v. Portugal, App. No. 37698/97, 34 Eur. Ct. H.R. 56
(2002) (libel); Thorgeir Thorgeirson v. Iceland, App. No. 1377/88, 14 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 843 (1992); Lingens v. Austria, App, No. 9815/82, 8 Eur. Ct. H.R. 407
(1986).
173. See Meltex Ltd. & Mesrop Movsesyan v. Armenia, App. No. 32283/04, 49
Eur. Ct. H.R. 40 (2009) (refusal of a broadcasting license).
174. See Vajnai v. Hungary, App. No. 33629/06, 50 Eur. Ct. H.R. 44 (2010)
(breach of political expression); Women on Waves & Others v. Portugal, App. No.
31276/05, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009); Vogt v. Germany, App. No. 17851/91, 21 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 205 (1996).
175. Claude-Reyes v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151 (Sept. 19,
2006).
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Human Rights presided over Chile’s refusal to provide
information on a deforestation project.176 The investment project
was controversial due to its potential environmental impact.177
There was no justification for the refusal and no access to an
effective remedy.178
Article 13 of the 1969 American Convention on Human
Rights is similar to Article 10 of the 1950 European Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
insofar that it incorporates the right to information within
provisions for the Freedom of Thought and Expression.179 In
Claude-Reyes, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
established that an Article 13 right to freedom of thought and
expression includes the right to seek, receive, and impart
information.180 Article 13 of the 1969 American Convention on
Human Rights “protects the right of the individual to receive such
information and the positive obligation of the State to provide
it.”181
These rights exist without any need for an applicant to prove
a direct interest or personal involvement. Exceptions are of
course permitted where there is a legitimate restriction, for
example, in situations that are necessary and satisfy a compelling
public interest.182 The need to respect the rights or reputations of
others or the protection of national security, public order, public
health, or morals would fall under this category.183 States have a
general obligation to adopt domestic legal provisions that give
effect to the right to information.184 Similar lines of argument
could also apply to protect the rights of future generations to an
effective remedy.

176. Id. at 2.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 3.
179. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 13, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123.
180. Claude-Reyes, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 151, at 41.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 46.
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Way before Europe has given effect to the Aarhus
Convention’s provisions to reconcile the rights to environmental
information with corresponding obligations, or those embodied in
Article 10 of the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights has elevated the right to information to a
discrete fundamental human right complete with attendant
obligations. For parties to the American Convention on Human
Rights, 1969, the right to information embodies both proactive
(anticipatory) and reactive (responsive) obligations. The Aarhus
Convention may present the most impressive substantive
embellishment of the potential to fulfill equity, but elaboration of
an ideal is not the same as adherence thereto (donner et retenir ne
vaut).
While the aforementioned cases contrast geographical
differences and priorities in terms of a human rights approach to
environmental information, jurisprudence stemming from issue
based sectoral treaties also provide a degree of sagacity on the
subject. The 2003 Ireland v. United Kingdom of Great Britain &
Northern Ireland dispute,185 concerning access to information
under Article 9 of the Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR Convention),186
before the Permanent Court of Arbitration, is emblematic. (The
dispute concerned “access to information” as defined by the 1992
OSPAR Convention).187
The OSPAR Convention establishes a framework that
obligates the Contracting Parties “to prevent and eliminate
pollution and to take the necessary measures to protect the
maritime area against the adverse effects of human activities so
as to safeguard human health and to conserve marine ecosystems
and, when practicable, restore marine areas which have been

185. Dispute Concerning Access to Information art. 9 of the OSPAR
Convention (Ir. v. U.K.-N. Ir.), 23 R.I.A.A. 59 (2003).
186. Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the NorthEast Atlantic, Sept. 22, 1992, 2354 U.N.T.S. 67 [hereinafter OSPAR
Convention].
187. Dispute Concerning Access to Information art. 9 of the OSPAR
Convention (Ir. v. U.K.-N. Ir.), 23 R.I.A.A. 59 (2003).
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adversely affected.”188 Article 1(a) of the Convention defines
“maritime area” as “the internal waters and the territorial seas of
the Contracting Parties, the sea beyond and adjacent to the
territorial sea under the jurisdiction of the coastal state to the
extent recognized by international law, and the high seas,
including the bed of all those waters and its sub-soil,” situated
within specified limits of the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans and their
dependent seas.189 Article 9 of the Convention provides for
“access to information.”190
Relying on its construction of Article 9(2) of the OSPAR
Convention, Ireland sought information about a Mixed Oxide
(MOX) Plant at Sellafield in the U.K.191 (Mixed oxide fuel is
nuclear fuel produced from reprocessed plutonium and
The U.K. argued that the information was
uranium).192
commercially sensitive and mooted for derogation on the basis of
commercial confidentiality as provided for by Article 9(3) of the
Convention.193
The dispute concerned three main provisions of the OSPAR
Convention.194 Article 9(1) of the OSPAR Convention requires
the Contracting Party’s competent authorities to respond to
reasonable information requests.195 Article 9(2) defines the
relevant information as “any available information in written,
visual, aural or data-base form on the state of the maritime area,
on activities or measures adversely affecting or likely to affect it
and on activities or measures introduced in accordance with the
Convention.”196 Article 9(3) provides for certain exceptions, for

188. OSPAR Convention, supra note 186, art. 2(1)(a).
189. Id. art. 1(a).
190. Id. art. 9.
191. Dispute Concerning Access to Information art. 9 of the OSPAR
Convention (Ir. v. U.K.-N. Ir.), 23 R.I.A.A. 59, 64 (2003).
192. Mixed Oxide (MOX) Fuel, WORLD NUCLEAR ASS’N, http://www.worldnuclear.org/info/inf29.html (last visited Feb. 14, 2012).
193. Dispute Concerning Access to Information art. 9 of the OSPAR
Convention (Ir. v. U.K.-N. Ir.), 23 R.I.A.A. 59, 80 (2003).
194. Id. at 81.
195. OSPAR Convention, supra note 186, art. 9(1).
196. Id. art. 9(2).

41

2012]

RIGHT TO KNOW AND DUTY TO DISCLOSE

181

example, that of “commercial and industrial confidentiality,
including intellectual property.”197
The Tribunal determined that Article 9(1) required an
“outcome of result, namely information falling within the
meaning of Article 9(2).”198
Under investigation, Ireland’s
request for information set out an inventory of commercial
requests, including sales, prices, and the number of employees.
In turning to whether information requests with respect to the
commissioning and operation of the MOX Plant at Sellafield are
“relevant information requests,” the Tribunal opined that Ireland
had failed to demonstrate that the information was “on the state
of the maritime area,” or that it “was likely to adversely affect
the maritime area.”199 As the information requested did not fall
under the OSPAR Convention, there was no need to ascertain
whether the U.K. could avail itself of an Article 9(3) exception.
Of note was that Ireland and the U.K. were both parties to
the OSPAR Convention, but had not ratified the Aarhus
Convention at the time of arbitration. Ireland signed the Aarhus
Convention on June 25, 1998, but had not ratified it by the time
of arbitration.200 (According to the U.N. Treaty register, Ireland
ratified the Aarhus Convention on June 20, 2012).201 The U.K.
signed the Aarhus Convention on June 25, 1998 and ratified it on
February 23, 2005.202 Furthermore, at the time of the arbitration
there was no EC directive in effect that adopted Aarhus
provisions.
As signatories to the Aarhus Convention, one could argue
that Ireland and the U.K. were demonstrating their intent to be
bound. Intent must therefore have some weight. An interesting
question arises as to what signifies intent. Issues concerning
treaty signature and putting initials to a treaty or suggesting

197. Id. art. 9(3).
198. Dispute Concerning Access to Information art. 9 of the OSPAR
Convention (Ir. v. U.K.-N. Ir.), 23 R.I.A.A. 59, 101 (2003).
199. Id. at 111.
200. Ireland Ratifies the Aarhus Convention, U.N. ECON. COMM’N FOR EUR.
(Sept. 9, 2001), http://aarhusclearinghouse.unece.org/news/1000432/.
201. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, at 447.
202. Id.
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that a treaty has “legal force” in the absence thereof are
sometimes less evident.
Situations such as those where ACP countries (countries of
Africa, the Caribbean, and Pacific) put initials to, rather than
signed, the ACP-EC Economic Partnership Agreements (EcPAs)
are illustrative. Article 10(b) of the Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties provides that in the failure of another agreement
that the “signature, signature ad referendum or initialing” of the
treaty “by the representatives of those states of the text of the
treaty or of the Final Act of a conference incorporating the text”
establishes the text of the treaty as authentic and definitive,
which may infer that it provides an understanding.203 In certain
circumstances, the object and purpose of that understanding is
not to be defeated. By virtue of Article 18 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties,
[a] state is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the
object and purpose of a treaty when: (a) it has signed the treaty
or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to
ratification, acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its
intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or (b) it has
expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the
entry into force of the treaty and provided that such entry into
force is not unduly delayed.204

A state may therefore enter into an obligation not to defeat a
treaty’s object and purpose on initialing a treaty and before it
enters into force.
Article 18(a) is not limited to signature.205 If state parties
exchange instruments establishing the text of a treaty as
authentic and definitive subject to approval, then the state
parties are obliged to refrain from acts that would defeat the
object and purpose of the treaty until they have made their

203. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 10(b), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
204. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
205. For an alternative view, see Lorand Bartels, The Legal Status of the
Initialed EPAs and Legal Constraints on Renegotiation, TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
INSIGHTS, Apr. 2008, available at http://ictsd.org/i/news/10682/.
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intention clear not to become a party to the treaty.206 Good faith
is paramount in international relations.
Good faith is a
universally recognized principle of general international law. It
also has significance within World Trade Organization (WTO)
law.207 In the absence of meeting strict criteria, one could also
ask whether discrimination against other developing countries is
an act of good faith.
Parties initialing regional treaties that are already Members
of the WTO have a concomitant obligation not to defeat the object
and purpose of WTO treaty law. For these parties, one may ask
whether a party initialed a treaty with the view to rely on the
good faith of the other to continue to inject influxes of aid for
trade and other derogated preferences. If this line of argument is
followed then either initialing the EcPAs signified the parties’
intended to be bound and, in return, they could receive special
favors; or the parties did not intend to be bound and they ought to
refrain from undue delay tactics and forfeit special preferences
that discriminate against others.
Putting an initial to the EcPAs could still constitute a
signature if it is established that the negotiating states so
agreed.208
Within this regard, a thorough review of the
preparatory works would be relevant before any legal opinion
could ascertain whether there was consent to be bound by an
“initial” that signified “signature.”
Other decisions have
subsequently influenced the EcPA process.209 The point to be
made in terms of the OSPAR case, and even in terms of future
climate accords, is that the OSPAR case invoked no such
consideration.210 Moreover, it would be a dangerous precedent to

206. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 18(a), May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
207. Andrew. D. Mitchell, Good Faith in WTO Dispute Settlement, 7 MELB. J.
INT’L L. 339, n.2 (2006).
208. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 12(2)(a), May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
209. Sandra Bartelt, ACP-EU Development Cooperation at a Crossroads? One
Year after the Second Revision of the Cotonou Agreement, 17 EUR. FOREIGN AFF.
REV. 1, n.1 (2012).
210. Dispute Concerning Access to Information art. 9 of the OSPAR
Convention (Ir. v. U.K.-N. Ir.), 23 R.I.A.A. 59 (2003).
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usurp the recognized process of negotiation-signature-ratification
without some just reason.
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has considered
similar issues although not on the same scale. The dictum in the
merits of the ICJ case Qatar v. Bahrain (judgment of March 16,
2001) observed that there might be some evidentiary value in
treaties signed but not ratified.211 As background, the AngloOttoman “Convention relating to the Persian Gulf and
surrounding territories” was signed on July 29, 1913, but was
never ratified.212 Qatar contended that non-ratification was
largely attributable to the outbreak of the first World War, but it
also pointed to a treaty ratified in 1914 that contained the same
intent as the 1913 Convention.213 Bahrain argued from two main
perspectives. First, Bahrain contended that non-ratification was
due to “the complex set of interdependent proposals [that] . . .
ultimately fell apart.”214 Second, Bahrain observed that the text
of the 1913 and 1914 treaties did not coincide.215
In terms of the ICJ’s findings,
[t]he Court observes that signed but unratified treaties may
constitute an accurate expression of the understanding of the
parties at the time of signature. In the circumstances of this case
the Court has come to the conclusion that the Anglo-Ottoman
Convention does represent evidence of the views of Great Britain
and the Ottoman Empire as to the factual extent of the authority
of the Al-Thani Ruler in Qatar up to 1913.216

What happened after signature, however, is something
completely different.
Whether it could be argued that consideration to be bound
possesses evidentiary value of a binding nature needs further
reflection, particularly if the Aarhus Convention may contribute
in the future to the universal constitutionalism of international
211. Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and
Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain.), 2001 I.C.J. 40 (Mar. 16).
212. Id. ¶ 45.
213. Id. ¶ 46.
214. Id. ¶ 47.
215. Id.
216. Id. ¶ 89.
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law. The term “consideration” is an interesting one, particularly
in terms of governing the international climate regime.
To proceed, the Article will address the following types of
questions. Is it possible to distinguish between different types of
consideration in international treaty law? Could one type of
consideration be that of “democratic consideration,” say that of
due parliamentary process within a dualist system?
Alternatively, in the absence of such consideration, could some
other type of consideration prevail, such as that of a monetary or
economic nature? Within the domain of lex specialis regimes in
particular, can exchanges of an economic nature, or equivalent
thereof, be constructed as legally binding promises to comply with
that which goes beyond a cruder intent to rally the troops?
Returning to the OSPAR dispute with these issues in mind,
the tribunal decided not to take the European Council’s Directive
2003/4/EC on public access to environmental information into
account.217 Directive 2003/4/EC entered into force on February
14, 2003, with transposition by member states due by February
14, 2005 at the latest.218 It is thereby rather stretching the point
to try to argue that all public authorities in the U.K. were bound
prior to the due implementation date and when the U.K.’s
ratification of the Aarhus Convention did not take place until
February 23, 2005, which was after the dispute.219
The next question to ask is what would have been the finding
if the Aarhus Convention and Directive 2003/4/EC on public
access to environmental information were applicable and within
the competence of the dispute settlement body? For that is surely
a most interesting question in the view of future challenges to
developing universal and effective rights to information in the
global commons.
The process of analysis pursued by the arbitral tribunal in
the OSPAR dispute is an apt example to employ in the ensuing
analysis. To do so, the analysis embraces three questions
systematically.
First, how do the Aarhus Convention and

217. Directive of the European Parliament and Council 2003/4/EC, 2003 O.J.
(L 41) 26-32.
218. Id. art. 12.
219. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63.
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Directive 2003/4/EC define environmental information? Second,
does the data on the commissioning and operations of a nuclear
fuel plant, like that requested by Ireland, fall into this allinclusive definition as provided for by the Aarhus Convention and
Directive 2003/4/EC; or, is the data too far removed from the
definition of “environmental information”? Third, if commercial
data could be interpreted as a type of environmental information,
is there any derogation to which the U.K. could avail itself to
protect commercial data?
The first task is to reach agreement on the terms.
Comparing the meaning of environmental information as
provided for by the Aarhus Convention with that provided for by
Directive 2003/4/EC is useful in this regard. Environmental
information under the Aarhus Convention and Directive
2003/4/EC includes any information in written, visual, aural,
electronic, or any other material form on the state of the elements
of the environment.220 To this definition, Directive 2003/4/EC
specifies reports on the implementation of environmental
legislation.221 Environmental information must concern the
elements of the environment, the “state” thereof, and be in a
material form.222
Under both instruments, “elements of the environment”
include air and atmosphere, water, soil, land, landscape, and
natural sites, biological diversity and its components, including
genetically modified organisms, and the interaction among these
elements.223 For Directive 2003/4/EC, landscape and natural
sites extends to include wetlands, coastal, and marine areas.224
The relevant information must pertain to these elements and, in
addition, to the “state” thereof.225 The “state” of the elements of
the environment may be interpreted to mean their environmental
condition, environmental predicament, administrative form,
220. Id. art. 2(3).
221. Id. art. 2(1).
222. Directive of the European Parliament and Council 2003/4/EC, para. 10,
2003 O.J. (L 41) 26.
223. Id. art. 2(1)(a); Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, art. 2(3)(a).
224. Directive of the European Parliament and Council 2003/4/EC, art. 2(1)(a),
2003 O.J. (L 41) 26. Coastal and marine areas are elements of specific relevance
to the OSPAR regulatory framework.
225. Id.
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quantitative structure, or application in environmental decisionmaking.226
The definition of environmental information goes further to
itemize “factors” affecting or likely to affect the specified elements
of the environment. These factors may predicate the condition or
the predicament of the environment. Such factors include, but
are not necessarily limited to, energy, noise, and radiation likely
(Directive
to affect the elements of the environment.227
2003/4/EC also includes waste, radioactive waste, emissions,
discharges, and other releases into the environment).228
In terms of the Aarhus Convention, factors include activities
of measures, including administrative measures, environmental
agreements, policies, legislation, plans and programs, affecting or
likely to affect the specified elements of the environment, and
cost-benefit and other economic analyses and assumptions used
in environmental decision-making.229 Activities and measures
may predicate the form and subject matter of environmental
information.
For example, Directive 2003/4/EC specifies
“measures (including administrative measures), such as policies,
legislation, plans, programs, environmental agreements, and
activities affecting or likely to affect the elements” and factors,
separately, as well as measures or activities designed to protect
those elements.230
Like the Aarhus Convention, environmental information as
defined in Directive 2003/4/EC includes cost-benefit and other
economic analyses and assumptions used within the framework of
the specified measures and activities.231 Prima facie, cost-benefit
and economic analyses is limited to that likely to affect
environmental elements and other factors, but it is inclusive of
both qualitative and quantitative data. For both instruments,
environmental information includes information on the state of
human health and safety, human life, cultural sites, and built
226. Id. para. 10.
227. Id. art. 2(1)(b).
228. Id.
229. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, art. 2(3)(b).
230. Directive of the European Parliament and Council 2003/4/EC, art. 2(1)(c),
2003 O.J. (L 41) 26.
231. Id. art. 2(1)(e).
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structures insofar as they are or may be affected by the state of
the elements of the environment or through these elements by
the factors, activities, or measures.232 (Directive 2003/4/EC
extends health and safety to include the contamination of the food
chain).233
To all appearances, while there are some differences between
the Aarhus Convention and Directive 2003/4/EC, the meaning of
environmental information as defined in both instruments is
intrinsically linked to the form of conveying information, the
subject matter of the information and factors affecting, or likely
to affect, that subject matter. As a directive, however, Directive
2003/4/EC on public access to environmental information is
binding on member states as to the result to be achieved.234
Discretion lies with national authorities as to the choice of form
and method of implementation.235 However, Directive 2003/4/EC
on public access to environmental information also makes it clear
that “provisions of Community law must be consistent with the
Aarhus Convention.”236 European Human Rights law is a
fundamental component of Community law and its interpretation
and application must be consistent with the Aarhus Convention
and vice-versa.
Seemingly, cost-benefit and other economic analyses and
assumptions used in environmental decision-making may be
considered environmental information, but only if their object and
purpose is to determine the state of the elements of the
environment. It is not therefore possible to define commercial
data and economic analysis of any sort as simply environmental
information within the construction of the Aarhus Convention
and Directive 2003/4/EC.
Even if the first hurdle is passed and the commercial data in
question is considered to be within the definition of
232. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, art. 2(3)(c); Directive of the European
Parliament and Council 2003/4/EC, para. 10, 2003 O.J. (L 41) 26.
233. Directive of the European Parliament and Council 2003/4/EC, para. 10,
2003 O.J. (L 41) 26.
234. Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union art. 288, Mar. 30, 2010, O.J. (C 83) 47.
235. Directive of the European Parliament and Council 2003/4/EC, art. 10,
2003 O.J. (L 41) 26.
236. Id. para. 5.
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environmental information, the Aarhus Convention and Directive
2003/4/EC provide for a number of other safeguards.237 These
safeguards are formulated as exceptions to the rule. Directive
2003/4/EC specifies:
Member States may provide for a request for environmental
information to be refused if disclosure of the information would
adversely affect: [inter alia] (d) the confidentiality of commercial
or industrial information where such confidentiality is provided
for by national or Community law to protect a legitimate
economic interest, including the public interest in maintaining
statistical confidentiality and tax secrecy.238

The country concerned could of course claim an adverse effect
on public security or national defense, but there must be some
justification to this claim.239 Even if the Aarhus Convention fell
within the domains of applicable law in the OSPAR dispute, the
Convention itself provides for similar safeguards that aim to
uphold the integrity of national sovereignty.
In another dispute, one on the admissibility of Sdruzení
Jihoceské Matky v. Czech Republic,240 the European Court of
Human Rights considered the request by a non-governmental
organization for information pertaining to a nuclear power
station under the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The genesis of the
dispute evolved from the construction of a soviet engineered
nuclear power station at Temelín as authorized by the ancient
regime of Czechoslovakia. After the change in regime in 1989, it
was decided to complete construction of the plant with the aid of
American technology. Residents living within the proximity of
Temelín founded a NGO (Sdruzení Jihoceské Matky of České
Budejovice).
Sdruzení Jihoceské Matky (South Bohemian
Mothers)
is
a
voluntary,
independent,
non-political,
environmental organization with the primary mission of

237. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, art. 4(3)-(4); see Directive of the
European Parliament and Council 2003/4/EC, art. 4(2), 2003 O.J. (L 41) 26.
238. Id. art. 4(2)(d).
239. Id. art. 4(2)(b).
240. Sdruzení Jihoceské Matky v. Czech Republic, App. No. 19101/03, 2006
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1205.
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protecting nature and landscape.241 Sdruzení Jihoceské Matky,
the applicant, sought information regarding the construction of
the plant and condemned the omission of an Environmental
Impact Assessment and the failure to be properly notified.
The applicant invoked Article 10 of the European Convention
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and claimed a
breach of freedom to receive information needed for the NGO’s
activities.242 The Court’s deliberations reopened the debate on
Article 10 of the Convention. It recalled that Article 10 section 2
of the Convention “concerns before all else, the access to general
sources of information and aims essentially to prohibit a State
from refusing access to information.”243 The Court “observed
equally that it is difficult to deduct that the Convention conveys a
right of general access to data and documents of an
administrative character.”244 And the Court observed that “the
present case concerns the access to information relative to a
central nuclear station, which is an installation of grand
complexity exigent a very high level of security.”245 The Court
therefore considered that Article 10 does not give an absolute
right to access all technical details relative to the construction of
a central nuclear plant.
In contrast to environmental impact information, it is not in
the general interest to disseminate this type of technical
information. “When the law to exercise the right to receive
information can impair the rights of others, public safety or
public health, the extent of the right to access information in
cause is limited by Article 10(2) of the Convention.”246

241. History of the Association, S. BOHEMIAN MOTHERS CIVIC ASS’N, http://tra
nslate.google.com/translate?hl=en&sl=cs&tl=en&u=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.jihoc
eskematky.cz%2F%3Fcl%3D1 (last visited Dec. 8, 2012).
242. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 36, art. 10(1) (providing for Freedom of
Expression, which also includes, in its first clause, a right to the “freedom to
hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers”).
243. Sdruzení Jihoceské Matky v. Czech Republic, App. No. 19101/03, 2006
Eur. Ct. H.R. 9.
244. Id. at 10.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 11.
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Regardless of the importance of a right to information, a
government’s right to protect industrial secrets, manage the risk
of potential terrorism, and protect the health and well-being of its
citizens is paramount.
In the circumstances of the Sdruzení Jihoceské Matky (South
Bohemian Mothers) dispute, and taking into account the margin
of appreciation left to states, an intervention in the application of
Article 10 to receive information is not disproportionate to certain
national objectives to be pursued. The grievance was thereby
rejected for manifest default of substance.
Of interest to this paper is that the Court directed its
analysis from an Article 10, right to information, provision.
While the Court strengthened the application of Article 10, the
right to information is still subject to national public interest. As
stipulated in Article 10, section 2:
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the
disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. 247

It should of course be pointed out that European Union
member states are also state parties to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and thereby agreed by
virtue of Article 19, section 3, that the exercise of the right to
seek, receive, and impart information
. . . carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may
therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be
such as are provided by law and are necessary: (a) for respect of
the rights or reputations of others; (b) for the protection of

247. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 36, art. 10(2).
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national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public
health or morals.248

Sdruzení Jihoceské Matky’s application was not deemed
inadmissible because Article 10 was not applicable.249 Imparting
such sensitive information could have been contrary to the
national interest.
In the future, it is likely that many more disputes will
leverage the Aarhus Convention to moot for the right to
environmental information. As in Sdruzení Jihoceské Matky and
by virtue of the Aarhus Convention and its implementing
directives, such information must be subject to certain limits.
According to the Aarhus Convention, public authorities are under
an obligation to respond to requests for information and to take
reasonable steps to prevent harm to human life or the
environment.250 There is a duty to inform, but that duty should
not be disciplined by restricting proactive and reactive obligations
encapsulated by the Aarhus Convention (donner et retenir ne
vaut). Instead, the duty to inform ought to be disciplined by the
integrity of the national courts in matters such as national
security, public safety, and public health. International law will
still have a defining role, especially when the information desired
resides or relates to the law of the global commons.
It may still be left to the ICJ to “fill in the gaps.” As observed
by the ICJ in South West Africa, “[i]t may be urged that the
Court is entitled to engage in a process of ‘filling in the gaps,’ in
the application of a teleological principle of interpretation,
according to which instruments must be given their maximum
effect in order to ensure the achievement of their underlying
purposes.”251 Likewise, in assessing the right to information in
the climate change regime, or any other lex specialis regime, the
right to information may be a fundamental right, but it is subject

248. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 6, art.
19(3).
249. Sdruzení Jihoceské Matky v. Czech Republic, App. No. 19101/03, 2006
Eur. Ct. H.R 1205.
250. See generally Aarhus Convention, supra note 63.
251. South West Africa (Eth. v. S. Afr.; Liber. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.J. 6, ¶ 91
(July 18).
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to condition and discipline by the framework within which it
exists.
II.

THE NEXUS BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL AND
MUNICIPAL CLIMATE LAW AND THE RIGHT
TO INFORMATION

Part one explained the nexus between international human
rights law, international environmental law, and the right to
information. The right to information also finds its relevancy and
disciplines in international climate law. Part two uses the
framework of proactive (anticipatory) and reactive (responsive)
obligations set out in part one to examine the right to information
about climate change and the adverse effects of climate harm. It
does this in two main ways. First, the study examines the right
to information as it applies to the right to know at an
international level. Second, the analysis turns to the national
level to examine the characteristics of the duty to disclose.
A. International Climate Law and the Right to
Information
The degree to which participants in the climate change
regime use information, or omit information from use, influences
the conduct of equity. The formulation, implementation, and due
process of subjective equity are issues of effect. Giving effect to
equity sometimes includes but is not limited to procedural equity.
A “conduct norm” may also incorporate a substantive norm.
Mitigating and adapting to extreme weather events, coping
with climate stress, and learning how to deal with a public health
crisis arising from climate injury demand timely and informed
decision-making. Decision-making is a process that should
consider both the guarantee and fulfillment of equity. An
inclusive process will facilitate the participation of interested
actors.
Effective implementation of the climate change treaty
regime—namely the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (UNFCCC), decisions of the UNFCCC
Conference of the Parties (COP Decisions), and, for some, the
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Kyoto Protocol—requires relevant and timely information.252
There is also a need to discipline the right to information. The
willingness to improve the quality of information, and the
capacity of climate change actors to use that information to
inform decision-making, should influence the evolution of future
agreements to mitigate and adapt to climate harm.
The UNFCCC treaty incorporates broad-reaching normative
provisions of the right to information.253 This section will focus
on the invocation of positive rights and proactive (anticipatory)
and reactive (responsive) obligations. It will highlight three main
substantive provisions of the UNFCCC provided for by Articles 4,
6, and 12 of the UNFCCC.254
Article 4 of the UNFCCC includes both proactive obligations
(anticipatory commitments to disseminate information) and
reactive obligations (commitments to respond to information
requests).255 Article 6 of the UNFCCC incorporates proactive
obligations to educate, train, and raise public awareness.256
Article 6(a), for instance, stipulates that “the Parties shall
promote and facilitate at the national and, as appropriate, sub
regional and regional levels, and in accordance with national laws
and regulations, and within their respective capacities: . . . public
access to information on climate change and its effects.”257 Public
access presumes the establishment of some response mechanism.
In a sense, this provision informs a reactive obligation. If not, the
mechanism would be ineffective. (Donner et retenir ne vaut). By
requiring all parties to communicate information on greenhouse
gas emissions (GHG emissions) to the COP through the
secretariat, Article 12 of the UNFCCC also blends international

252. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May, 9 1992,
U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18, 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992) [hereinafter U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change]; see Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc
FCCC/CP/1997/7/ [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
253. Id.
254. Id. art. 4, 6, 12.
255. Id. art. 4.
256. Id. art. 6.
257. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 252, art.
6(a).
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and municipal obligations of a proactive (anticipatory) and
reactive (responsive) nature.258
Commitments under Article 4(1) of the UNFCCC oblige,
either explicitly or indirectly, the formulation and publication of
information in virtually every sub-clause.259 Article 4(1)(a)
provides for information requests and publishing information
concerning inventories of anthropogenic emissions.260 Article
4(1)(b) provides for measures to mitigate climate change.261
Article 4(1)(c) provides for information on technology transfer.262
Article 4(1)(e) provides for adaptation plans for coastal zone
management.263 Article 4(1)(f) provides for climate change
national impact assessments.264 Article 4(1)(g) provides for the
development of data archives.265 Article 4(1)(h) provides for the
exchange of relevant scientific, technological, technical, socioeconomic, and legal information related to the climate system and
climate change.266 Article 4(1)(i) provides for the promotion and
cooperation in education, training, and public awareness related
to climate change and encouraging the widest participation in
this process, including that of NGOs.267 Article 4(1)(j) governs
the communication of information concerning implementation in
accord with Article 12.268
Article 12 of the UNFCCC obliges the Parties to inform the
COP of climate change data.
Communicating national
inventories to the COP is mandatory. Article 12(1)(a) stipulates:
In accordance with Article 4, paragraph 1, each Party shall
communicate to the Conference of the Parties, through the
secretariat, the following elements of information:

258. Id. art. 12.
259. Id. art. 4(1).
260. Id. art. 4(1)(a).
261. Id. art. 4(1)(b).
262. Id. art. 4(1)(c).
263. Id. art. 4(1)(e).
264. Id. art. 4(1)(f).
265. Id. art. 4(1)(g).
266. Id. art. 4(1)(h).
267. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 252, art.
4(1)(i).
268. Id. art. 4(1)(j).
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(a) A national inventory of anthropogenic emissions by sources
and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by
the Montreal Protocol, to the extent its capacities permit, using
comparable methodologies to be promoted and agreed upon by
the Conference of the Parties. 269

Article 12 also obliges progress reports on implementing the
Convention.
Some UNFCCC Article 4 commitments reconcile positive
(actionable) rights with reactive (responsive) obligations, such as
handling information requests. Other commitments reconcile
positive (actionable) rights with proactive (anticipatory)
obligations, such as promoting public awareness and
communicating information regarding implementation.
The UNFCCC also incorporates proactive obligations by
virtue of Article 6 obligations. Article 6 sets out obligations to
educate, train, and raise public awareness as needed to fulfill
Article 4 commitments.270 The scope of Article 6’s fairness
provisions also extend to public access to information, public
participation, and international cooperation. In addition, Article
6 commitments link to Article 10(e) of the Kyoto Protocol, which
provides obligations on all contracting Parties concerning
international cooperation, implementation of education and
training programs, capacity building, public awareness, and
public access to information on climate change.271
COP Decision 11/CP.8 (2002) adopted a five-year work
program on Article 6 and encouraged Parties to make full use of
the Global Environmental Facility to support implementation.272
An intermediate review at COP 10 in Buenos Aires, 2004, (COP
Decision 7/CP.10) further endorsed the New Delhi program and
emphasized specific actions that the Parties could take, such as

269. Id. art. 12(1)(a).
270. Id. art. 6.
271. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 252, art. 10(e).
272. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, New Delhi,
India, Oct. 23-Nov. 1, 2002, Conference of the Parties Report of the Conference of
the Parties on its Eighth Session, Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken By the
Conference of the Parties at its Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2002/7/Add.2
(March 28, 2003), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop8/07a01.pdf
[hereinafter UNFCCC, New Delhi].
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collecting, analyzing, and disseminating information on climate
change trends and increasing information exchange between
states and non-state actors.273 Decision 9 of COP 13 (held in Bali
in 2007) amended the New Delhi work program and extended it
for another five years.274 In 2010, COP 16 (Conference of the
Parties) / CMP 6 (Conference of the Parties serving as the
meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol) recognized the
importance of giving effect to equity as a driver of
implementation even further when it adopted the decision
entitled “Progress in, and ways to enhance, the implementation of
the amended New Delhi work program on Article 6 of the
Convention.”275
In addition, the UNFCCC’s COP Rules of Procedure, which
govern participation, inherently contain provisions on the right to
information. Rule 7(1) of the UNFCCC’s COP Rules of Procedure,
and those of its subsidiary bodies, permits “any governmental or
nongovernmental, national or international, body or agency
qualified in matters covered by the Convention and which has
informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session
of the Conference of the Parties as an observer may be so
admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present at the
session object.”276 Rule 7(2) provides that “such observers may,
upon invitation of the President, participate without the right to
vote in the proceedings of any session in matters of direct concern
to the body or agency they represent, unless at least one third of

273. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Buenos
Aires, Dec. 6-18, 2004, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Tenth
Session, Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the Parties at
its Tenth Session, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/2004/10/Add.1 (Apr. 19, 2005), available
at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop10/10a01.pdf.
274. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bali, Dec. 315, 2007, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Thirteenth Session,
Addendum, Reporting on Global Observing Systems for Climate, U.N. Doc
FCCC/CP/2007/6 (March 14, 2008), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/
2007/cop13/eng/06a02.pdf.
275. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Progress In,
and Ways to Enhance, the Implementation of the Amended New Delhi Work
Programme on Article 6 of the Convention (2010), http://unfccc.int/
files/meetings/cop_16/conference_documents/application/pdf/20101204_cop16_c
mp_art6.pdf (last viewed Feb. 14, 2012).
276. Id.
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the Parties present at the session object.”277 The UNFCCC
Secretariat has also set out guidelines for participation, which
incorporate the freedom of expression and the right to
information.278
Like the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol incorporates extensive
provisions by which to govern the right to information. To give
an example, Article 2(1)(b) of the Kyoto Protocol provides for
sharing of information on policies and measures to quantify
emission limitation and reduction commitments to promote
sustainable development. Article 7 gives more precision to the
submission of information, such as information to supplement
annual GHG inventories (Article 7(1) Kyoto Protocol),
information to demonstrate compliance (Article 7(2) Kyoto
Protocol), and preparation of guidelines for the preparation of the
required information (Article 7(4) Kyoto Protocol); whereas,
Article 8 of the Kyoto Protocol provides for a review of Article 7’s
informational requirements.
While the UNFCCC treaty regime governing climate law
provides for the right to information, a number of other
conditions discipline that right. Disclosure duties for developed
versus developing countries differ.
Developed countries
encounter far more rigorous informational obligations than
developing countries. Developed countries are to provide the
COP with detailed descriptions of policies and plans that they
have adopted with the view to implementing UNFCCC Article 4
commitments.
Besides the universal international treaty regime of the
UNFCCC, which includes UNFCCC COP Decisions, other legal
instruments also incorporate a right to climate change
information. Each party to the Aarhus Convention is obligated to
promote education and awareness amongst the public on
environmental
information,
which
includes
promoting
information on the air and the atmosphere and, arguably, climate
change. Moreover, Article 7 paragraph 3 thereto provides that
“[e]ach Party shall promote the application of the principles of
277. Id.
278. UNFCCC Secretariat, Guidelines for the Participation of Representatives
of Non-Governmental Organizations at Meetings of the Bodies of the United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Mar. 2003).
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this Convention in international environmental decision-making
processes and within the framework of international
organizations in matters relating to the environment.”279 Parties
to the Aarhus Convention thereby endorse the application of the
Aarhus provisions within the context of climate law.
Despite the Aarhus Convention providing a regulatory
framework for giving effect to equity, it remains surprising just
how seldom parties refer to the Aarhus Convention in climate
change negotiations. As pointed out in a 2008 report published
by the International Council on Human Rights entitled Climate
Change and Human Rights: A Rough Guide, “It is surprising,
given the essential role that information and participation must
play in developing adaptation policies, that Aarhus 3(7) appears
not to have been invoked or insisted upon in those
negotiations.”280
The obligation to collate and disseminate “accurate” climate
change information is a case in point.
As with the
aforementioned illustrative cases covering international human
rights law and environmental law, climate change cases raise
significant concerns about the discipline of climate law.
Svitlana Kravchenko’s study entitled Procedural Rights as a
Crucial Tool to Combat Climate Change cites a good example in
the Ukraine. According to Kravchenko,
the NGO coalition, Climate of the Future Without Danger for Life
in Ukraine, knew before UNFCCC COP-14 in Poznan, that
Ukraine’s commitment to reduce GHG emissions 20% by 2020 in
reality meant an emissions increase by 70% due to economic
decline after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The coalition tried
to push the government to change its position and convey these
revised statistics before COP-15 in Copenhagen. When the NGO
coalition failed to convince Ukraine’s government, it made a
statement at COP-15 revealing the real situation.281

279. Aarhus Convention, supra note 63, art. 7(3).
280. THE INT’L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS, CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: A ROUGH GUIDE 50 (2008).
281. Svitlana Kravchenko, Procedural Rights as a Crucial Tool to Combat
Climate Change, 38 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 613, 623 (2010).
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Questions have also arisen in the search for the whereabouts of
some 320 million euros in carbon trading monies that Ukraine
was thereby able to raise selling hot air credits under the
international emissions trading mechanism.282
Equally prevalent in climate law is a similar confusion
relating to proactive (anticipatory) and reactive (responsive)
obligations in international environmental law. Responding to
requests for information about climate change is one thing.
Proactively collating, disseminating, and improving public
awareness on the adverse effects of climate change is something
altogether different.
The UNFCCC establishes the legal architecture needed to
discipline existing and future agreements. It also includes
guidelines for measurement, reporting, and verification, which
are vital to discipline accountability, integrity, and temporality.
Even so, going into Rio 20 and UNFCCC COP 18, the landscape
was murky as to which groups require what sort of information
and whether stakeholders have relevant and timely information
in order to make informed decisions. Using Rio 20, to consolidate
the right to information and the duty to disclose would have been
a step forward. In the future, other opportunities will arise
through the UNFCCC COP. The parties could make progress by
developing a cohesive architecture to benchmark monitoring,
verification, and reporting internationally.
A needs based approach could segment the stakeholders and
their relevant issues concerning the right to information and then
analyze each cluster independently. Reference to the private
sector provides an example. What levels of disclosure do private
sector organizations require?
Do all citizens need a
comprehensive understanding of the technical scientific
underpinnings of climate change? Should the impetus be on
supporting citizens to enhance energy efficient activities at home?
What role should the climate change constituencies have in
channeling information to the right sectors? In terms of children
and youth, for instance, should climate change information be

282. Ukraine’s AAU ‘Black Hole’, CLIMATE ACTION NETWORK INT’L (June 8,
2010), http://www.climatenetwork.org/blog/ukraine%E2%80%99s-aau-%E2%80
%A8%E2%80%98black-hole%E2%80%99.
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integrated within school curriculums? In terms of farmers,
should support they receive for crop rotation also incorporate an
informational campaign on the adverse effects of climate change?
In terms of potential climate change refugees, or “climate
migrant” in a preferred legal parlance, do they have a right to
know and make informed decisions?
The issue of displaced persons is another good example as to
where progress could be made. The African Union’s Convention
for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons
in Africa (Kampala Convention), adopted October 22, 2009
(entered into force as of March 16, 2011),283 will perhaps be even
more relevant albeit that the international treaty regime on
refugee law has its gray areas and gaps in terms of climate
change displacement.284 The Kampala Convention obligates the
African Union to “share information with the African Commission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights on the situation of displacement,
and the protection and assistance accorded to internally displaced
persons in Africa,” including those displaced due to natural or
human made disasters, amongst which climate change is
specifically listed.285
Article 10 of the Kampala Convention provides for
“displacement induced by projects.”286 Article 10(2) provides that
“States Parties shall ensure that the stakeholders concerned will
explore feasible alternatives, with full information and
consultation of persons likely to be displaced by projects.”287 As
an example of a relevant issue, a question could arise as to
whether bilateral investment treaties should also incorporate
provisions for the right to climate change under investment
promotion and protection.
These issues are of course

283. African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally
Displaced Persons in Africa, Oct. 22, 2009, 40 I.L.M 85 [hereinafter Kampala
Convention] (the Kampala Convention shall enter into force thirty days after the
deposit of the instruments of ratification or accession by fifteen Member States).
284. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,
1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; see also Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan
31, 1967, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
285. Kampala Convention, supra note 283, art. 8(3)(e).
286. Id. art. 10.
287. Id. art. 10(2).
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controversial; but the task of policy makers and the international
jurist is to solve problems not to avoid them.
Universally and interoperability requires finding the right
balance between a differential needs based approach, a common
“peoples” rights based approach, and respective capabilities at all
levels, the national level included. Common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities derive from the legal
principle of equity but have an intrinsic link to other
fundamental principles of international climate law, such as the
principle of sustainable development. In accordance with Article
3(4) of the UNFCCC,
the Parties have a right to, and should, promote sustainable
development. Policies and measures to protect the climate
system against human-induced change should be appropriate for
the specific conditions of each Party and should be integrated
with national development programmes, taking into account that
economic development is essential for adopting measures to
address climate change.288

The following section addresses the normative context of
integration as a right to know and a duty to disclose.
B. National Climate Law and the Right to Information
1. A Right to Know. . .
In parallel with advancing frameworks for the right to
climate change information at the international level, endeavors
to reinforce the right to information and improve the right to
know and the duty to disclose must advance nationally.
Comparisons of the right to climate change information in the
four municipal jurisdictions of Germany, England, Wales, and the
United States illustrate the practicalities. First, reference to the
Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland & Germanwatch
v. Germany dispute will illustrate developments of the right to
climate change information in Germany. Second, analysis of the
2007 “Inconvenient Truth” case will exhibit interpretation of the
288. U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note 252, art
3(4).
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right to climate change information by the courts of England and
Wales. Third, reflection on a series of interactions between
federal and state law in the U.S. will demonstrate other pertinent
issues.
In turning to Germany, applicants in the administrative
dispute Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland &
Germanwatch v. Germany sought information on export credit
guarantees, but the relevant ministry refused the request.289
(Export credit guarantees provide financial support for climate
change). Could the applicants invoke a reactive (responsive)
obligation on the respondents to provide information?
In dispute was whether the request for climate-related
information constituted “environmental information.”290 Energy
projects supported by export credits certainly affect
environmental
elements,
such
as
the
atmosphere.
Notwithstanding, did the actual granting of export credits
constitute environmental information?
The German Access to Environmental Information Act
(Umwelt Informations Gesetz or UIG) of December 22, 2004, as
amended on February 14, 2005, was relevant. Section 3.1 of the
UIG provides for the right of every person to have free access to
environmental information held by or for public authorities.291
The wording of section 3.1 is similar to like provisions of the
Aarhus Convention and Directive 2003/4/EC; and the UIG itself
permits broad interpretation to give effect to European wide law.
The primary purpose of Germany’s export credit support
program was to aid Germany’s economy, but where an
environmental impact assessment was required there was “an
important secondary or intermediate purpose” to protect the
environment.292 In citing the OECD, the court viewed that
“granting or denying export credit support/guarantees will
positively or negatively affect the implementation of a project and

289. Verwaltungsgericht [VG] [Administrative Court Berlin] Jan. 10, 2006, 10
A 215.04, translated in Unofficial Translation of the German Original (Climate
Justice Programme, Feb 3, 2006), available at http://www.climatelaw.org
/cases/country/germany/exportcredit/.
290. Id.
291. Id. at 5.
292. Id. at 7.
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therewith will, with some probability, also affect the
environment.”293
The Ministry of Economics and Labor had already
acknowledged
that
export
credit
supports
considered
environmental concerns. The request for information on export
credit supports was therefore, in the circumstances of the present
case, environmental information. Yet, could the government still
request derogation?
The government pleaded for compromise. To be valid, such
claims must reach a certain degree of “seriousness.”294 The
request was not manifestly unreasonable.
It was not
commercially sensitive to the extent that justified a waiver of the
public interest. The administrative order thereby required the
government to disclose the relevant information requested, but in
the interests of a fair and equitable compromise, not every tiny
detail of that information required disclosure.295
In England and Wales, the Stuart Dimmock v. Secretary of
State for Education and Skills case, or “Inconvenient Truth” case,
was overtly mediatized. Like Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz
Deutschland & Germanwatch v. Germany, the case involved
administrative law. The High Court of Justice, Queen’s Bench
Division of the Administrative Court, heard the case in 2007.296
By way of background, Stuart Dimmock, the father of two
sons at a state school and school governor, sought to revoke a
decision, by the then Secretary of State for Education and Skills,
to distribute a copy of former U.S. Vice-President Al Gore’s film,
An Inconvenient Truth, to every state secondary school in
England.297 An Inconvenient Truth (AIT) was part of a pack of
short films supported by a guidance note.298 Dimmock mooted
that climate change was a partisan political view and that the
promulgation of a politically orientated film violated the law.299

293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.

Id. at 7-8.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 12.
Id.
Id. ¶ 1.
Id.
Id. ¶ 2.
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Justice Burton considered the film political but not “partypolitical.”300 For Burton the government “understandably formed
the view that AIT was an outstanding film, [it had won an Oscar,
was professionally produced, and persuasively argued] and that
schools should be enabled to show it to pupils.”301 Simply
facilitating the showing of the film, and issuing an accompanying
guideline, was not in the court’s opinion “a promotion of partisan
political views.”302
Notwithstanding, the film contained a number of “alarmist”
errors, which supported Al Gore’s political crusade. Al Gore
claimed that a “sea level rise of up to 20 feet (7 meters) will be
caused by melting of either West Antarctica or Greenland in the
near future.”303 “Think of the impact of a couple of hundred
thousand refugees when they are displaced by an environmental
event and then imagine the impact of a 100 million or more,” said
Gore. 304 For Justice Burton, this claim was “distinctly alarmist,
and part of Mr. Gore’s ‘wake-up call.’” Justice Burton remarked:
It is common ground that if indeed Greenland melted, it would
release this amount of water, but only after, and over, millennia,
so that the Armageddon scenario he predicts, insofar as it
suggests that sea level rises of 7 metres might occur in the
immediate future, is not in line with the scientific consensus. 305

It was also difficult to substantiate Gore’s claim that Pacific
Islanders have all had to flee to New Zealand due to
anthropogenic global warming that has inundated Pacific
atolls.306 Justice Burton responded that there is simply no such
evidence of evacuation happening yet.307
Seasonal work
programs and sporting incentives—rugby perhaps—may provide

300. Verwaltungsgericht [VG] [Administrative Court Berlin] Jan. 10, 2006, 10
A 215.04, ¶ 3.
301. Id. ¶ 6.
302. Id. ¶12.
303. Id. ¶ 24.
304. Id.
305. Id. ¶ 25.
306. Id. ¶ 26.
307. Id.
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some supplementary economic incentive to migrate but not
climate change.
In reference to “Shutting down of the ‘ocean conveyor”’ Al
Gore remarked that:
At the end of the last ice age . . . that pump shut off and the heat
transfer stopped and Europe went back into an ice age for
another 900 or 1000 years. Of course that’s not going to happen
again, because glaciers of North America are not there. Is there
any big chunk of ice anywhere near there? Oh yeah [pointing at
Greenland].308

In response, Justice Burton stated, “According to the IPCC, it is
very unlikely that the ocean conveyor (known technically as the
Meridional Overturning Circulation or thermohaline circulation)
will shut down in the future, though it is considered likely that
thermohaline circulation may slow down.”309 Arguments that
there was a “direct coincidence between rise in CO2 in the
atmosphere and in temperature” establishing an “exact fit” were
invalid.
Claims that Mount Kilimanjaro’s snows are vanishing, that
Lake Chad is evaporating, and that polar bears are disappearing
could simply not be substantiated as being attributable to
human-induced climate change.310 At the time of the film there
had been no evidence to establish that retreating snowlines from
Mt. Kilimanjaro were attributable to human-induced climate
change.311 Justice Burton considered the drying up of Lake Chad
to be “far more likely to result from other factors, such as
population increase and over-grazing, and regional climate
variability.”312
Likewise, Hurricane Katrina was not then
attributable to a nexus between weather and climate change.313
Other errors in the film related to the integrity of
information disseminated about coral reefs. Gore argued:
308. Verwaltungsgericht [VG] [Administrative Court Berlin] Jan. 10, 2006, 10
A 215.04, ¶ 27.
309. Id.
310. Id. ¶ 29-32.
311. Id. ¶ 29.
312. Id. ¶ 30.
313. Id. ¶ 31.
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Coral reefs all over the world because of global warming and
other factors are bleaching and they end up like this. All the fish
species that depend on the coral reef are also in jeopardy as a
result. Overall species loss is now occurring at a rate 1000 times
greater than the natural background rate. 314

In reference to the scientific view of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC), Justice Burton observed that “if the
temperature were to rise by 1-3 degrees Centigrade, there would
be increased coral bleaching and widespread coral mortality,
unless corals could adopt or acclimatize, but that separating the
impacts of climate change-related stresses from other stresses,
such as over-fishing and polluting, is difficult.”315
In conclusion, the Court determined that the film AIT could
be shown, subject to certain conditions.316 Apparent flaws in
informational integrity were to be corrected.317 Provided the
apparent errors were corrected and the film shown under
appropriate guidance, children should be stimulated into
discussion and debate about climate change from the perspectives
of science, geography, and citizenship.
A plethora of climate change related cases have also emerged
in the United States. In his work on “Global Warming in the
Courts,” Pidot identifies four main categories of litigation before
U.S. state and federal courts.318 First, Clean Air Act litigation
considers whether GHG emissions are a type of pollutant subject
to regulation under the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).319 Second, National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
litigation results from inadequate disclosure of climate change
consequences arising from projects addressing environmental
quality.320 Third, a collection of climate change disputes may fall

314. Verwaltungsgericht [VG] [Administrative Court Berlin] Jan. 10, 2006, 10
A 215.04, ¶ 33.
315. Id.
316. Id. ¶ 44.
317. Id. ¶ 37.
318. Justin R. Pidot, Global Warming in the Courts, GEO. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y
INST. 1 (2006); see also MICHAEL B. GERRARD, GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S.
LAW (2007).
319. Pidot, supra note 318, at 1; Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (2006).
320. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4344.
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under the tort of nuisance.321 Fourth, pre-emption litigation
revolves around disputes concerning state vis-a-vis federal
competence in climate change claims and the regulation of GHG
emissions.322
Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency (2007)
was the first decision of the Supreme Court to consider the
application of the Clean Air Act (CAA) to climate change.323
Calling global warming “the most pressing environmental
challenge of our time,” a group of States, local governments, and
private organizations alleged in a petition for certiorari that the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had abdicated its
responsibility under the Clean Air Act to regulate the emissions
of four greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide. 324

On the issue of standing, the U.S. Supreme Court considered
that the jurisdictional argument of requiring at least one
practitioner to have standing was of a “serious character,” but in
the “absence of any conflicting decisions . . . the unusual
importance of the underlying issue persuaded [the Court] to grant
the writ.”325
In April 2007, the Court held in Massachusetts v. EPA that
the CAA gives the EPA statutory authority to regulate tailpipe
emissions from new motor vehicles because tailpipe emissions are
“greenhouse gases [that] fit well within the Clean Air Act’s
capacious definition of ‘air pollutant.’”326 By authorizing the EPA
to regulate GHG emissions, the decision in Massachusetts v. EPA
results in regulation beyond motor vehicles. Smith points out
that “the EPA can avoid promulgating such regulations only if it
determines that greenhouse gases do not contribute to climate
change.”327 In 2011, the Court clarified that “Massachusetts

321. Pidot, supra note 318, at 1.
322. Id.
323. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
324. Id. at 505 (internal footnotes omitted).
325. Id. at 505-06.
326. Id. at 532.
327. Don C. Smith, Commentary: Landmark U.S. Supreme Court Decision
Puts U.S. on Likely Path to Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 15 UTIL.
POL’Y 215 (2007).
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made plain that emissions of carbon dioxide qualify as air
pollution subject to regulation under the [Clean Air] Act.”328
The petition was significant for several reasons, two of which
were prominent. The first reason related to non-state actors, in
that a powerful public-private sector lobby supported the petition.
Second, was the opinion that GHG emissions are pollutants to be
regulated under the statutory authority of the CAA. (CAA
litigation aims to compel a regulator to take a specific action, i.e.
give effect to positive and negative rights).
In an injunctive form, another entire suite of climate change
litigation aims to curtail a private company from acting, i.e. gives
effect to a negative right. Polluting emissions from coal-fired
plants have long been controversial and are arguably a
contravention of the CAA. Such disputes concerning GHG
emissions came under scrutiny by the U.S. Supreme Court in the
2007 decision Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp. when
a group of environmental NGO’s brought a claim against one of
America’s largest power generation companies.329
Duke Energy made several construction modifications to its
plants, which permitted the company to operate longer hours and
thereby increase annual net emissions. The company argued that
there was no change in hourly emissions. Duke Energy did not
therefore obtain an EPA approval permit for the modifications. It
was unclear though as to why the EPA should put such a gloss on
whether information should be based on hourly emissions or an
increase in emissions. Rabinowitsh points to the Washington
Post’s take on this issue: “[i]t should not take the Supreme Court
to determine what it means to ‘increase’ the air pollution put out
by power plants.”330
Disclosure goals of NEPA were considered in line with the
dictum of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Idaho
Sporting Congress v. Thomas.331 Idaho Sporting Congress v.

328. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011).
329. Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 570-71 (2007).
330. Nicholas H. Rabinowitsh, Bringing New Source Review Back: The
Supreme Court's Surprise (and Disguised) Attack on Grandfathering Old Coal
Plants in Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
251, 270-71 (2008) (internal footnote omitted).
331. Idaho Sporting Congress v. Thomas, 137 F.3d. 1146 (9th Cir. 1998).
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Thomas concerned the potential impacts of a timber sale within
the Targhee National Forest in Idaho. The court held that in
preparing an assessment of the impacts of a timber sale under
NEPA the United States Forest Service (USFS) must provide the
data underlying its expert’s opinion that the project will not
In essence,
result in significant environmental impacts.332
disclosure goals of NEPA are responsive, i.e. “to insure the agency
has fully contemplated the environmental effects of its action,”
and anticipatory, i.e. “to insure the public has sufficient
information to challenge the agency.”333
Justice Stevens delivered a relevant opinion in Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council (1989). Stevens stated:
The sweeping policy goals announced in § 101 of NEPA are thus
realized through a set of “action-forcing” procedures that require
that agencies take a “‘hard look’ at environmental consequences,”
and that provide for broad dissemination of relevant
environmental information.
Although these procedures are
almost certain to affect the agency’s substantive decision, it is
now well settled that NEPA itself does not mandate particular
results, but simply prescribes the necessary process. 334

The Supreme Court gave weight to both proactive
(anticipatory consequences) and reactive (responsive) obligations
embodied in the right to information.
American Electric Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut is a far more
recent dispute that demonstrates even further the conspicuous
position of non-state actors to influence climate law.335 It
demonstrates the importance of “conduct norms” at the local
level. It clarifies the relationships with federal common law.
In its original context the dispute concerned controls to be
placed on corporate emitters of harmful carbon dioxide
emissions.336
Did five electric power companies (American
Electric Power, Duke Energy, Southern Company, Tennessee
332. Id. at 1154.
333. Id. at 1149.
334. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989)
(citations omitted).
335. See Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 582 F.3d 309, 314 (2d Cir. 2009).
336. See id. at 314.
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Valley Authority, and Xcel) create a “public nuisance” by
contributing to global warming? Plaintiffs asserted that the
companies emitted “650 million tons per year of carbon
dioxide,”337 which comprised “approximately ten percent of all
carbon dioxide emissions from human activities in the United
States.”338 Another important question was whether states and
private parties could seek injunctive relief under the federal
common law of nuisance to cap a company’s carbon dioxide
emissions at judicially determined levels.339
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit identified
two elements of public nuisance: (i) an “unreasonable
interference,” and (ii) “a right common to the general public.”340
In determining “unreasonableness” the Second Circuit further
cited three mutually exclusive circumstances when an
interference with a common public right is unreasonable: (a) the
conduct involves a significant interference with common public
rights (health, safety, peace, comfort, or convenience), (b) the
conduct is proscribed by law, and (c) “whether the conduct is of a
continuing nature or has produced a permanent and long-lasting
effect, and, as the actor knows or has reason to know, has a
significant effect upon the public right.”341 Interestingly, the
Second Circuit applied the same logical distinction between
conduct and result that is so firmly entrenched in European civil
law.
Environmental lobbyists pursuing the claim that carbon
dioxide emissions are a nuisance, and should be capped or
reduced, faced a setback in 2010 when the U.S. Acting Solicitor
General (Neal Katyal) argued that the plaintiffs did not have
standing.342 For the U.S. Department of Justice, such disputes
were more suited for Congress and the executive branch rather
than judicial resolutions: the Courts were not de facto

337. Id.
338. Id. at 316.
339. See id. at 326.
340. Id. at 352 (citation omitted).
341. Id.
342. See Stephen Power, Obama Stance on Climate Suit Stuns Allies, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 26, 2010, http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/08/26/obama-stanceon-climate-suit-stuns-allies/.
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regulators.343 On December 6, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court
said it would issue a writ of certiorari granting review of the
lower court’s decision.344
In granting the petition, the Supreme Court was presented
with three specific questions. Do states and individuals have
standing to sue on the common law tort of nuisance for injuries
allegedly caused by climate change?345 Are such arguments nonjusticiable as political questions?346 Is the equitable tort of
nuisance displaced by legislation regulating greenhouse gas
emissions, notably that of the CAA or NEPA?347
American Electric Power Company Inc. et al. filed their
respective briefs on January 31, 2011, and Connecticut et al. filed
on March 11, 2011.348 In addition to these briefs, amici curiae
briefs made public and private interests known.349
In deciding the case on June 20, 2011, the Supreme Court
found that the CAA confers powers on the EPA to manage GHG
emissions.350 The Court referred to the EPA’s response to the
decision in Massachusetts v. EPA: the EPA has started a
rulemaking under § 7411 of the CAA.351 Section 7411 addresses
standards for limiting emissions of air pollutants from “new,
modified and existing fossil-fuel fired power plants.”352 The
Court put the spotlight on the EPA’s obligations: “Pursuant to a
settlement finalized in March 2011, EPA has committed to
issuing . . . a final rule by May 2012.”353

343. Greg Stohr, Global Warming Claims Against AEP, Utilities to Get U.S.
High Court Review, BLOOMBERG, Dec. 6, 2010, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2010-12-06/aep-utilities-get-u-s-supreme-court-review-on-warming-suit.html.
344. See id.
345. See Julia Ciardullo, AEP v. Connecticut: A Comparison of the Briefs Filed
by the Defendant Electric Utilities, CLIMATE L. BLOG (Feb. 15, 2011),
http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/climatechange/2011/02/15/aep-v-connecticut-acomparison-of-the-briefs-filed-by-the-defendant-electric-utilities/.
346. Id.
347. Id.
348. Id.
349. See Stohr, supra note 343.
350. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2011).
351. See id. at 2537.
352. Id. at 2533.
353. Id.
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The Supreme Court held that “the Clean Air Act and the
actions it authorizes displace any federal common law right to
seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired
power plants.”354 Further, there is a new federal common law for
subjects of national concern: “When we deal with air and water in
their ambient or interstate aspects, there is a federal common
law.”355 It is not a question of a “federal general common law”
but a question of an emerging “new federal common law.”356 The
decision is therefore critically important to the broader study that
informs this Article insofar that a universal “new federal common
law” is emerging to regulate the global commons. A jus gentium
may emerge ad hoc or it may emerge through good governance.
In making its decision the Supreme Court endorsed a new
constitutional model of international climate law, one that
derives from the object and purpose of the legislation. When a
competent authority confers powers on a third party the mandate
of the third party is to be legally binding, i.e. valid because it is
legitimate and effective. Rather than displace equity, legislative
codification gives effect to equity if it facilitates the fulfillment of
rights and obligations through, inter alia, accountability,
integrity, and temporality conferred on competent agencies. For
the Supreme Court, “[t]he test for whether congressional
legislation excludes the declaration of federal common law is
simply whether the statute ‘speak[s] directly to [the] question’ at
issue.”357 The CAA clarifies that it is for the EPA to set emission
standards and therefore “speaks directly to the question at
issue.”358 Indeed, in comparison to federal judges, it makes sense
that a specialized agency ought to be more equipped to leverage
scientific, economic, and technological competence in deciding
how to regulate emissions.
The agency can no longer argue that it does not have
authority to regulate GHG emissions. In the event the EPA fails
to be effective, i.e. “does not set emission limits for a particular
pollutant or source of pollution,” then “States and private parties
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.

Id. at 2537.
Id. at 2535 (internal citation omitted).
See id.
Id. at 2537 (internal citation omitted).
See id.
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may petition for a rulemaking, and EPA’s response will be
reviewable in federal court.”359 Simply stated, if the EPA does
not carry out its statutory duties, the plaintiffs could end up back
in the Supreme Court via a Court of Appeals review, and,
ultimately, a petition for certiorari. However, “were EPA to
decline to regulate [CO2] emissions altogether at the conclusion of
its . . . rulemaking, the federal courts would have no warrant to
employ the federal common law of nuisance to upset the agency’s
expert determination.”360 The decision thereby blocked states
and non-state actors from going to the federal courts to file for
public nuisance; but they could go to court to request a
determination as to the scope and application of the CAA, subject
to exhausting their avenues via the EPA first.
While the EPA currently “occupies the field” for making
determinations under the CAA, a far more interesting question
relates to the nature of the EPA’s take on the rulemaking. To
date, environmental lobbyists have been concerned about EPA’s
indecision, but EPA now knows that if it does not follow the nod
of the Supreme Court that it could soon find itself in court again
and be subject to review.
In addition, there are likely to be some complex
multidimensional issues involved. With respect to trade, what
will be the take on powerful private actors benefiting from states
with weaker climate laws and then trading energy to stronger
states, e.g. those that have adopted climate change norms
through regional cap-and-trade programs?
The equitable tort of public nuisance is not closed. There is
an evolving federal common law of the commons. Another
interesting question concerns state nuisance, which depends on,
inter alia, the preemptive effect of the CAA.361 (A state law could
be invalid if it contradicts a federal law). If a federal common
climate law confers on the EPA then it could be argued that the
EPA also has a duty to ensure that the CAA preempts any

359. Id. at 2538 (internal citations omitted).
360. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. at 2539.
361. Id. at 2540; see generally KENNETH STARR ET AL., THE LAW OF PREEMPTION:
A REPORT OF THE APPELLATE JUDGES CONFERENCE, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
27-29 (1991).
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inconsistent state law.362 In American Electric Power, the
Supreme Court left the question of relief under state law open for
consideration on remand.363 But the Court also referred to the
Clean Water Act as not precluding plaintiffs from bringing a case
for nuisance at the state level.364 The aforementioned traderelated cases that are at the nexus of competition law and climate
law may well reappear as nuisance claims at the state level.
While the issue will be reviewed in conformity with the
decision of the Supreme Court, it is still to be seen whether a
Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court (if it gets that far) will
consider the preemption of public nuisance claims. If so, will the
relevant court look beyond causation to ascertain, first and
foremost, whether emitting excessive carbon-dioxide pollutants is
an equitable nuisance per se? If so, there will be no need to
confine the hearing to statutory interpretation of a plethora of
crisscrossing laws or to prove that such activity impinges on the
enjoyment of life. Liability would be absolute and injury to the
public, perhaps even injury to future generations, would be
presumed by the nature of the very action of emitting excessive
carbon dioxide. As a result, the right to relief would be
established by averment and proof of the mere activity would be
all that is needed. Even if the dispute on standing does move to
incorporate causation, and causation is proved, there is always
the issue of redressability with which to contend. The petitioners
could counter-argue that the relief sought by the plaintiffs will
not slow global warming or prevent future harm without much
heavier commitments by the U.S. and other states to reductions
in GHG emissions.
In terms of public nuisance, the flooding of a small Alaskan
village may be the next major decision in climate law.365 In
question is whether energy companies contributed to GHG
emissions and rising sea levels that flooded and destroyed a

362. Cf. Altria Group, Inc. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 78-79 (2008) (explaining that
the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 contains two express
preemption provisions).
363. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2540 (2011).
364. See id. (citing Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 488 (1987)).
365. See generally Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d
849 (9th Cir. 2012).
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native Alaskan village of Kivalina and displaced local villagers.366
Any future developments ought to be watched with keen interest,
not only from the U.S. and common law countries, but also by the
international community.
2. . . . And a Duty to Disclose
Advancing agreed guidelines at the global level remains
important because climate change crosses borders and invokes a
new law of the global commons. Giving effect to these guidelines
is both an individual and collective responsibility. It also
concerns state and non-state actor accountability. To bring these
dynamics into the fold, this section provides an overview of some
of the international framework issues for reporting under the
UNFCCC. It introduces the role of corporate responsibility as a
lead in to the following section, which compares and contrasts
climate disclosure obligations in the U.S. with those in the U.K.
a. International Guidelines for National
Communications
The UNFCCC COP adopted guidelines for the preparation of
national communications by Annex I countries (decision 17/CP.7)
and Non-Annex I countries (decision 17/CP.8) in 2002.367 In
December 2011, the UNFCCC COP 17 reinforced in Durban that
a shared vision for long term cooperation “should be guided by the
principles of equity and common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities,” an Article 3 (1)
UNFCCC provision.368 In line with this direction, the COP
meeting in Durban adopted new national guidelines for enhanced
action on mitigation from developed and developing countries.
These actions, which cover biennial reporting guidelines for both

366. See id. at 853.
367. UNFCCC, New Delhi, supra note 272.
368. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Durban,
South Africa, Nov. 28-Dec. 11, 2011, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its
Seventeenth Session Addendum, Part Two: Action Taken by the Conference of the
Parties at its Seventeenth Session: Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working
Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, ¶ 160, U.N. Doc.
FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1 (March 15, 2012).
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developed and developing countries, and a registry for
international support to developing countries, will be subject to
international scrutiny.369
Besides obligations on developed countries, there is a
legitimate expectation that developing countries will also honor
their commitments consistent with their respective capabilities.
Factors for consideration include needs assessments, the capacity
to report on national greenhouse gas inventories, the capacity to
inventory mitigation actions, and the capacity to report on all the
aid received and dispensed from state and non-state actors.
Whether the support received has been effective and produced
results also requires examination by the entire global community.
In short, work towards a common and effective accounting
framework applicable to all will be essential to reinforcing a law
of the global commons and strengthening a right to information
as a fundamental “peoples” right.
At the end of 2012, the UNFCCC COP meeting in Qatar
recognized this proposed approach to identifying “common
elements” for developed countries insofar that the COP
decided to establish a work programme under the Subsidiary
Body for Scientific and Technological Advice to continue the
process of clarifying the quantified economy-wide emission
reduction targets of developed country Parties, particularly in
relation to the elements contained in decision 2/CP.17, paragraph
5, with a view to: (a) Identifying common elements for measuring
the progress made towards the achievement of the quantified
economy-wide emission reduction targets; (b) Ensuring the
comparability of efforts among developed country Parties, taking
into account differences in their national circumstances.370

369. Id. at 6-11.
370. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Doha, Nov.
26 - Dec. 8, 2012, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its 18th Session
Advance Unedited Version, Draft Decision, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. -/CP.18 (Dec. 8, 2012)
(discussing the agreed outcome pursuant to the Bali Action Plan, “(b) Enhanced
national/international action on mitigation of climate change . . . (i) Measurable,
reportable and verifiable nationally appropriate mitigation commitments or
actions, including quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives, by all
developed country Parties, while ensuring the comparability of efforts among
them, taking into account differences in their national circumstances”). For
information on national adaptation plans and least developed countries, see id.
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Proper reporting is a critical aspect of the right to
information. It will help to ensure a robust common accounting
framework in order to facilitate transparency in counting
emission reductions, avoid the double provision of national and
international aid to developing countries, and help to measure
and verify the tangible results of aid provided by a plurality of
international actors. These issues lead naturally to a discussion
on corporate responsibility.
b. Corporate Responsibility
Private companies gained a victory in American Electric
Power. However, so-called procedural equity, which in this
context is really a type of subjective equity, does not
automatically foreclose liability. A recent vitality in the duty to
disclose has sparked a series of obligations for non-state actors.
Private companies are no longer immune to climate change
regulations and disclosure of activities.
Indeed, for many companies there is an increasing concern
with respect to reporting requirements—and rightly so. The
world’s largest companies are some of the main contributors to
GHG emissions. According to the Carbon Disclosure Project’s
(CDP) 2011 Supply Chain Report, “the emissions of about 2,500 of
the largest global corporations account for roughly 20-25% of the
world’s GHG emissions.”371 Writing in 2012, the CDP went
further to say that “climate change has become a mainstream
business issue.”372
Not surprisingly, a number of companies seem to have little
difficulty in quantifying the harm others cause them, yet these
same companies often seem to be in a state of denial as to their
concomitant obligations. When it comes to risk management and
disclosure many companies are able to pinpoint precise
geographical regions where harm occurs and set in place
programs for compensation (albeit not necessarily in Alaska).

371. A.T. KEARNEY, CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, SUPPLY CHAIN REPORT 2011:
MIGRATING TO A LOW CARBON ECONOMY THROUGH LEADERSHIP AND
COLLABORATION 1 (2011).
372. ACCENTURE, CDP SUPPLY CHAIN REPORT 2012: A NEW ERA: SUPPLIER
MANAGEMENT IN THE LOW-CARBON ECONOMY ii (2012).

79

2012]

RIGHT TO KNOW AND DUTY TO DISCLOSE

219

The 2012 CDP Supply Chain Report provides a number of
examples. “PepsiCo estimates its total potential exposure to
ingredients and agriculture from changes in climate at $12 billion
per year.”373 In response, PepsiCo helped its suppliers in
Southern Chile to “upgrade their irrigation systems, leading to a
35% reduction in water use.”374 Walmart “estimated that its
60,000 suppliers contributed 72% of the company’s total
emissions as of 2006.”375 In response, it focused on setting new
energy targets in its top 200 factories in China.”376
While recognizing geographic self-harm from climate change
and devising corrective solutions, companies acknowledge the
difficulty in “determining a clear return on investment for supply
chain measures.”377 In parallel, as companies take even more
resolute strides to manage climate risk, investors ought to
demand more rigorous accounting standards in GHG emissions
disclosure. Improved legal standards could address traceability
and exposure to water risk throughout the climate value chain.
As CDP points out, not only do conglomerates have to be able to
measure, quantify, and report their GHG emissions, but their
suppliers must be able to do so also.378
For investors, the report launched by Mercer’s Responsible
Investment team in February 2011, titled “Climate Change
Scenarios - Implications for Strategic Asset Allocation,” observes
that “climate policy could contribute as much as 10% to overall
portfolio risk” over the next twenty years.379 Risk exposure is
also prominent at the climate-water nexus. Recent disasters in
Pakistan and Thailand are illustrative. “Hennes & Mauritz
(H&M) reported a surprise 30% fall in profits in the first quarter
of 2011, largely because the price of cotton doubled in the
previous 12 months as a result of increased global demand and
disruption to supplies caused by drought and floods in cotton

373. Id. at 7.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. See id.
377. Id.
378. See id. at 9.
379. MERCER, CLIMATE CHANGE SCENARIOS - IMPLICATIONS FOR STRATEGIC ASSET
ALLOCATION 1 (2011), available at http://www.mercer.com/climatechange.
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producing countries like Pakistan.”380 Outsourcing to low-cost
Thailand also came at a cost: “severe floods in this region in
October 2011 caused a shortage in the supply of hard disks
around the world.”381 “In 2011 the Yangtze delta, which supports
400 million people and 40% of China’s economic activity,
experienced its worst drought in 50 years . . . [and] led to power
cuts that dampened manufacturing output, and disrupted
distribution channels by closing river networks, including
hundreds of kilometers of the Yangtze and its tributaries.”382
While isolating a single root cause is near impossible, part of the
problem is due to climate change.
A 2008 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
study flagged an additional investor concern when it “listed
climate change as the number one risk facing the insurance
industry.”383 The IPCC advances further and declares that there
is a lack of insurer appetite to cover climate losses. As a result,
investors are left with restricted, or non-existent, flood insurance
due to the “high concentration of losses due to catastrophic
floods.”384
On March 17, 2009, the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners adopted a compulsory requirement for insurance
companies to disclose financial risks from climate change to
regulators.385 In addition, insurance companies have to report
the actions they are taking to respond to those risks.386 An
extract from the press release reads, “All insurance companies
with annual premiums of $500 million or more will be required to

380. ACCENTURE, supra note 372, at 14.
381. Id.
382. Id.
383. SEC Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed.
Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. Parts 211, 231 & 241), available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106fr.pdf.
384. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE AND
WATER, IPCC TECHNICAL PAPER ON CLIMATE CHANGE 75 (Bryson Bates et al. eds.,
2008).
385. See Press Release, Nat’l Ass’n of Insurance Comm’rs, Insurance
Regulators Adopt Climate Change Risk Disclosure (Mar. 17, 2009) (on file with
author), available at http://www.naic.org/Releases/2009_docs/climate_change_
risk_disclosure_adopted.htm.
386. Id.
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complete an Insurer Climate Risk Disclosure Survey every year,
with an initial reporting deadline of May 1, 2010.”387
Climate risk is an investment risk. Managing climate risk
exposure gives impetus to the growing rise in socially responsible
investment law. In March 2011, the Financial Times reported,
“Twenty U.S. companies have agreed to take more account of
environmental issues, such as water use and greenhouse gas
emissions, as a result of investor resolutions, in a sign of
increased pressure on industries, such as power generation and
oil and gas production.”388 Ceres cites four climate change risks
that will influence investment and impinge on investor decisions:
physical risks, regulatory risks, litigation risks, and risks to
reputation.389 Investors have a right to know about the extent of
the climate risks. Companies have a duty to disclose.
Incumbent upon many companies is the duty to reveal
information and to establish and maintain disclosure controls. It
is equally important to ensure that information collection and
dissemination is not an exercise for the sake of exercising.
Companies should not be set under such pressures to search for
unproven or unknown information simply to appease investor
appetite.
Some companies are providing information about climate
risk, their carbon footprints, and their initiatives to reduce them.
Others are uncertain about their obligations and probably worry
about the integrity of the data to be released. What is certain is
that investors around the world are clamoring for relevant
information.
What is uncertain is how to discipline an
information provision to uphold the subjective tests of equity,
which are tests of effect. Such concerns may be unwarranted
provided one may lift the corporate veil to discipline the right to

387. Id.
388. Ed Crooks, US Companies Yield to Environmental Push, FIN. TIMES, Mar.
7, 2011, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/ccc960a2-48eb-11e0-af8c-00144feab49a.
html#axzz2B0UOefgO.
389. See BERKLEY ADRIO, CERES, CLEARING THE WATERS: A REVIEW OF
CORPORATE WATER RISK DISCLOSURE IN SEC FILINGS (June 2012), available at
www.ceres.org/resources/reports/clearing-the-waters-a-review-of-corporatewater-risk-disclosure-in-sec-filings/view.
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information by way of employing the proposed objective and
subjective tests of equity.
3. Piercing the Veil
The following section compares and contrasts climate
disclosure obligations in the U.S. with those in the U.K. Lifting
the veil of incorporation may be just and equitable when it
reveals that a constituent’s freedoms and duties extend beyond
its obligations to traditional stakeholders. A constituent with
conferred powers may have common but differentiated obligations
to the global community as a whole. It may play a pivotal role in
giving effect to the universal constitutionalism of international
climate law. This section thereby includes but goes beyond state
responsibility. It demonstrates how mobilizing the right to
information as a normative derivative of equity may affect shared
responsibility and a unified architecture of human rights in the
global commons.
a. Climate Disclosure Obligations in the U.S.
Controversies concerning climate change disclosure
requirements are emerging at a rapid pace. Examples from the
U.S. and the U.K. are illustrative. Controversies surround the
Kyoto Protocol and instruments for “cap-and-trade.” The U.S.
has never ratified the Kyoto Protocol while Canada denounced
the Protocol in December 2011.390 Conversely, the U.K. ratified
the Kyoto Protocol. The U.S. has seen a number of recent capand-trade bills collapse before Congress. The U.K. has seen its
climate change bill succeed before Parliament. Despite these
radical departures, the duty to disclose climate change
information remains equally pressing on both sides of the
Atlantic.
In the U.S., the Waxman Markey cap-and-trade bill, also
known as the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009,
390. Kyoto Protocol, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/3145.php (last visited Nov. 17,
2012); Canada Pulls Out of, Denounces Kyoto Protocol, CBSNEWS.COM, Dec. 13,
2011,
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57341907/canada-pulls-out-ofdenounces-kyoto-protocol/.
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H.R. 2454,391 passed in the House on June 26, 2009. However, it
did not pass in the Senate insofar as it was placed on the Senate
Legislative Calendar (July 7, 2009) and did not come up for a
vote.392
The energy bill aimed “to create clean energy jobs, achieve
energy independence, reduce global warming pollution and
transition to a clean energy economy.”393 A cap-and-trade system
would have introduced a broad range of carbon tariffs to foreign
imports that did not comply with U.S. regulatory requirements
for climate change. For the U.S., however, there would have been
a broad range of export exceptions, rebates, and allowances. The
bill foresaw derogations for developing countries; however, for
foreign companies operating in the U.S., the U.S. would have in
essence regulated their climate change regimes on a de facto basis
through U.S. disclosure requirements.394 It would have been for
the U.S. Administration to notify foreign countries of products
that would not be exempted from certain aspects of the regulatory
regime.395
In some ways the American Clean Energy and Security Act of
2009 (a bill) was a spin on the European Union’s Emission
Trading Scheme. (Some of the proposed disclosure provisions
gave rise to similar controversies in the context of regulating
cross border aviation emissions, issues that will be discussed
below). Given the structure of the bill’s discriminatory privileges,
however, meant that it could have provided an even greater
incentive to maximize rent seeking and minimize state
responsibility for emission trading.
The Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act is another
relevant bill that introduces an economy-wide cap-and-trade

391. Related bills include H.R. RES 587, 111th Cong. (2009), American Clean
Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2998, 111th Cong. (2009), and Clean
Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2010).
392. See Bill Summary & Status, 111th Congress (2009 - 2010), H.R.2454, THE
LIBRARY OF CONG., http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:H.R.2454: (last
visited Nov. 17, 2012).
393. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
(2009).
394. See id.
395. Id. § 765(c)(1).
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program.396 Also known by its sponsor as the “Kerry-Boxer” bill,
the bill was introduced September 30, 2009 and placed on the
U.S. Senate’s Legislative Agenda under general orders on
February 2, 2010.397 The “Kerry-Boxer” bill aims to “create clean
energy jobs, promote energy independence, reduce global
warming pollution, and transition to a clean energy economy.”398
By virtue of Economy-wide Emission Reduction Goals (Section 3;
S.1733), the bill provides for the steady reduction in GHG
emissions such that:
(1) [I]n 2012, the quantity of United States greenhouse gas
emissions does not exceed 97 percent of the quantity of United
States greenhouse gas emissions in 2005; (2) in 2020, the
quantity of United States greenhouse gas emissions does not
exceed 80 percent of the quantity of United States greenhouse
gas emissions in 2005; (3) in 2030, the quantity of United States
greenhouse gas emissions does not exceed 58 percent of the
quantity of United States greenhouse gas emissions in 2005; and
(4) in 2050, the quantity of United States greenhouse gas
emissions does not exceed 17 percent of the quantity of United
States greenhouse gas emissions in 2005. 399

Put differently, the bill sets goals to reduce U.S. GHG
emissions below a 2005 baseline year.400
The goals are
progressive: a reduction of three percent below the 2005 baseline
by 2012,401 twenty percent below the 2005 baseline by 2020,402

396. See Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111th Cong. §§
702, 703(a) (2009) (amended 2010); Victor B. Flatt, “Offsetting” Crisis? - Climate
Change Cap-and-Trade Need Not Contribute to Another Financial Meltdown, 39
PEPP. L. REV. 619 (2012).
397. Bill Summary & Status, 111th Congress (2009-2010), S.1733, THE LIBRARY
OF CONG., http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:S1733: (last visited Nov.
17, 2012).
398. Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act, S. 1733, 111 th Cong. (2009)
(amended 2010).
399. Id. § 3.
400. See id. § 3(1).
401. Id.
402. Id. § 3(2).

85

2012]

RIGHT TO KNOW AND DUTY TO DISCLOSE

225

forty-two percent below the 2005 baseline by 2030,403 and eightythree percent below the 2005 baseline by 2050.404
In sum, the Waxman Markey cap-and-trade bill did not
manage to secure a Senate vote and the “Kerry-Boxer” bill
remains on the Senate Legislative Calendar but has not
progressed any further. A Congress reluctant to “cap-and-trade”
is not, however, to say that Congress is reticent on the entire
climate law issue. Congress has a long established history of
recognizing climate rights. (The National Climate Program Act of
1978, the Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, the Global
Change Research Act 1990 are pertinent examples; and, of
course, the Bush Administration signed the UNFCCC in 1992).
Back in 2008, Congress found that there was a difference
between regulating GHG emissions and studying the issues more
thoroughly.
The Consolidated Appropriations Act 2008
established a Climate Change Study Committee to investigate
and study issues relating to global climate change, make
recommendations as to needed steps, and facilitate a declaration
of Congress’s existing findings.405
Section 430 of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act 2008 stipulates clearly:
(a) The Congress finds that - (1) greenhouse gases accumulating
in the atmosphere are causing average temperatures to rise at a
rate outside the range of natural variability and are posing a
substantial risk of rising sea-levels, altered patterns of
atmospheric and oceanic circulation, and increased frequency and
severity of floods, droughts, and wildfires; (2) there is a growing
scientific consensus that human activity is a substantial cause of
greenhouse gas accumulation in the atmosphere; and (3)
mandatory steps will be required to slow or stop the growth of
greenhouse
gas
emissions
into
the
atmosphere.
(b) It is the sense of the Congress that there should be enacted a
comprehensive and effective national program of mandatory,
market-based limits and incentives on emissions of greenhouse
gases that slow, stop, and reverse the growth of such emissions at
a rate and in a manner that: (1) will not significantly harm the

403. Id. § 3(3).
404. Id. § 3(4).
405. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 114(a),
121 Stat. 1844, 1897 (2007).
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United States economy; and (2) will encourage comparable action
by other nations that are major trading partners and key
contributors to global emissions.406

At an agency level the EPA’s endangerment finding of
December 2009, effective January 14, 2010, is important. “The
Administrator finds that greenhouse gases in the atmosphere
may reasonably be anticipated both to endanger public health
and to endanger public welfare.”407 If the second circuit in AEP v.
Connecticut were to be followed, an argument could be made that
the endangerment finding establishes a de facto test of
unreasonableness if a company continues to harm a public right.
Proponents of this view might suggest that a company wrongfully
causes an injury by wrongfully omitting to curb GHG emissions.
Giving legal security to the right to information through
enhanced disclosure duties imposes a far more burdensome
obligation on companies. It is rather peculiar that the failure to
do so may open the door to hold non-state actors accountable
anyhow. Companies will have to be ever more vigilant. U.S.
companies with commercial presence in member states ratifying
the Kyoto Protocol may of course fall under the ambit of Kyoto
Compliance.408 Internally though, U.S. companies also have a
number of disclosure obligations under federal security laws and
regulations.
The SEC published interpretative guidance for public
companies on climate change disclosure on February 8, 2010.409
The Commission’s guidance regarding U.S. rules of disclosure
refer, inter alia, to the framework of the requisite forms regulated
by Regulation S-K and Regulation S-X,410 and to certain material

406. Id. § 430.
407. Endangerment and Cause or Contribute Findings for Greenhouse Gases
Under Section 202(a) of the Clean Air Act, 74 Fed. Reg. 66495, 66497 (Dec. 15,
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 1).
408. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 252.
409. SEC Guidance Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed.
Reg. 6290 (Feb. 8, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. Parts 211, 231 & 241), available
at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/2010/33-9106fr.pdf.
410. Id. at 6293.

87

2012]

RIGHT TO KNOW AND DUTY TO DISCLOSE

227

information required of Securities Act Rule 408 and Exchange Act
Rule 12b-20.411
As early as the 1970s, the SEC issued guidance on the
disclosure of material climate change information that could
impact on a company’s financial condition.412
The SEC
considered the Supreme Court’s referral in Basic Inc. v. Levinson
to the materiality test evoked in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway
(1976): “[T]o fulfill the materiality requirement, ‘there must be a
substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact
would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made
Any examination of the facts demands a
available.’”413
systematic evaluation within the relevant regulatory context as to
which facts are material.
The SEC briefly outlines specific disclosure requirements
under Regulation S-K.414 U.S. companies may disclose climate
change information when describing their business under Item
101 of Regulation S-K;415 but they must disclose capital costs,
earnings, and competitive influences of a contingent, known, or
certain material effect.416 Item 101 is therefore focused on the
economic and financial costs of compliance.417 It is for the
company to disclose whatever environmental information is
material to future reporting cycles.418
Item 103 of Regulation S-K provides for disclosure of climate
change related litigation of a material effect.419 To illustrate, if
the dispute concerns environmental law, then the company must
disclose an administrative or judicial proceeding if it is material

411. Id.
412. Id. at 6292-93.
413. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988); see also TSC Indus.
Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
414. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Commission Guidance Regarding Disclosure
Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290, 6293 (Feb. 8, 2010) (codified at
17 C.F.R. Parts 211, 231 & 241), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/interp/
2010/33-9106fr.pdf [hereinafter Sec. & Exch. Guidance].
415. Id.
416. Id.
417. See id.
418. Id.
419. Id.
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to a company’s business or financial condition. Item 103 also
designates disclosure thresholds, which are indicative of
information of a material effect.420
Item 303 of Regulation S-K requires a management
discussion and analysis of the company’s financial condition and
operational results.421 It provides the opportunity for investors to
see a company through the manager’s eyes and through a
qualitative and far more subjective discussion of the business.
The enquiry is two-fold. First, is the uncertainty of a trend or
event reasonably likely to occur or is there a conjecture of a
knowable possibility?422 (There is an assumption of uncertainty
unless management can conclude otherwise).423 Second, if the
trend or event is reasonably likely to occur, or a knowable
possibility could be of a material effect, then the company must
(Non-disclosure can only be justified when
disclose.424
management can determine that the occurrence of the trend or
event is not reasonably likely to have a material effect on the
company).425
Significant climate change factors may well lead to relevant
industry, company, or investment risks, and there is a growing
tendency for companies to abide by disclosing specific risks rather
than simply using boilerplate templates.
Climate change
disclosure may therefore also concur with the disclosure of risk
factors by virtue of Item 503(c) of Regulation S-K.426
In sum, the SEC identifies Items 101, 103, 303, and 503(c) of
Regulation S-K as potential “triggers” of climate change
disclosure.427
In addition, certain states have their own
particularities. Some require CO2 emissions reporting, such as
for electricity companies.428

420. Sec. & Exch. Guidance, supra note 414.
421. Id. at 6294.
422. Id.at 6295.
423. Id.
424. Id.
425. Id.
426. Id. at 6295-96.
427. Jeffery M. McFarland, Warming Up to Climate Change Risk Disclosure,
14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 281, 290 (2009).
428. Id. at 304.
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A 2011 Ceres report evaluated the degree to which U.S.
companies reporting is consistent with SEC guidelines. The
report entitled, “Disclosing Climate Risks: A Guide for Corporate
Executives, Attorneys & Directors” reads, “Despite the SEC
guidance, this report’s review of companies’ most recent 10-K
filings shows that improvements in climate risk disclosure have
been incremental at best. And while voluntary reporting on
climate risks is helpful, it is not sufficient.”429 The SEC points
out too that voluntary company disclosure can in no way become
a substitute for a cohesive de jure governing framework of
conformity and compliance regulation.430 Such pitfalls have
already been observed at the international level.
While there are critics, the U.S. has not only long recognized
the importance of climate rights, but also of building a
comprehensive national policy and de jure frameworks for climate
change disclosure. The National Environmental Policy Act of
1969 establishes a national policy for the environment,431
provides for the establishment of a Council on Environmental
Quality,432 and sets out detailed information and impact
assessment requirements.433
The Environmental Impact
Statement required by NEPA is an environmental disclosure
document.434
Moreover, the Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases
Rule (40 C.F.R Part 98) was an EPA response to the Consolidated
Appropriations Act 2008 and has legal authority under its
existing CAA authority.435 In its summary, the “Part 98” Rule
reads:

429. JIM COBURN ET AL., CERES, DISCLOSING CLIMATE RISKS & OPPORTUNITIES IN
SEC FILINGS: A GUIDE FOR CORPORATE EXECUTIVES, ATTORNEYS & DIRECTORS 2
(2011) (“Ceres is a national coalition of investors, environmental groups[,] and
other public interest organizations working with companies to address
sustainability challenges such as global climate change.”).
430. Id. at 4.
431. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970).
432. 42 U.S.C. § 4342 (1970).
433. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970).
434. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i) (1975); see also Climate Change, US EPA,
http://epa.gov/climatechange/index.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
435. 40 C.F.R. § 98 (issued by the EPA in response to the Consolidated
Appropriations Act of 2008).
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EPA is promulgating a regulation to require reporting of
greenhouse gas emissions from all sectors of the economy. The
final rule applies to fossil fuel suppliers and industrial gas
suppliers, direct greenhouse gas emitters and manufacturers of
heavy-duty and off-road vehicles and engines. The rule does not
require control of greenhouse gases, rather it requires only that
sources above certain threshold levels monitor and report
emissions.436

The Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program (GHGRP) under
Part 98 requires reporting of GHG data and other relevant
information from large sources and suppliers in the US. The
EPA’s achievement in releasing 2010 nationwide GHG emissions
data for large facilities and suppliers on January 11th 2012 is
significant. For the first time, comprehensive GHG emissions
information was publically available across nine industry groups,
including twenty-nine source categories, which directly emit GHG
emissions in large quantities.437
Part 98, as operated under EPA’s GHGRP, has also given rise
to business concerns regarding the business impact from
disclosure and the use of confidential data.438 These concerns
pushed the consideration of three deferral actions into 2011.439
Determinations remained on proposals to change reporting dates
for certain data elements, to defer the reporting date for certain
data elements, and to extend the comment period on inputs to
emission equations.440
The EPA made further progress in 2012. On February 24,
2012, the EPA issued a proposal to determine which data
elements reported under subpart W of Part 98 (petroleum and
natural gas) would or would not be entitled to confidential

436. Mandatory Reporting of Greenhouse Gases, 74 Fed. Reg. 56260 (Oct. 30,
2009) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 86, 87, 89, 90, 94, 98, 1033, 1039, 1042,
1045, 1048, 1051, 1054, 1065).
437. Press Release, US EPA, 2010 Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data from
Large Facilities Now Available / First Release of Data Through the National
GHG Reporting Program (Jan. 11, 2012) (on file with author).
438. Id.
439. Id.
440. Id.
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treatment under the CAA.441 These data elements were to be
reported to EPA for the first time in September 2012. In
addition, this proposed rule proposes to defer the deadline for
reporting some recently added subpart W data reporting elements
that are “inputs to emission equations” until 2015. An EPA
notice of October 26, 2012, informs that certain named
contractors will be permitted to access confidential business
information submitted to EPA under the GHGRP “no sooner than
November 6, 2012.”442 Materiality (an objective test) and access
(a subjective test) have thereby become the linchpins of U.S.
climate disclosure.
EPA’s obligatory reporting rule reinforces the duty to a
reasonable investor. It should therefore come as no surprise that
shareholder activism for companies to disclose information is
mounting. Concerns arise about how companies manage climate
litigation risk. Whether a company’s information disclosure is
keeping up with its peers is another factor that affects share
price.
Enacting positive shareholder rights with concomitant
proactive (anticipatory) and reactive (responsive) obligations on
private companies is another pathway to meet the subjective tests
of equitable rights to information. Rule 14a-8 of the U.S.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides an opportunity for a
shareholder to have his or her proposal included in the company’s
proxy materials for presentation to a vote at an annual or special
meeting.443
In general, the company is to include the
shareholder’s proposal as long as it is valid and follows certain
procedures.444 The proposal may be excluded if it falls within one
of the substantive bases for exclusion.445

441. Proposed Confidentiality Determinations for the Petroleum and Natural
Gas Systems Source Category, and Amendments to Table A–7 of the
Greenhouse Gas Reporting Rule, 77 Fed. Reg. 11039 (proposed Feb. 24, 2012),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-02-24/pdf/2012-4320.pdf.
442. Access by EPA Contractors To Confidential Business Information Related
to the Greenhouse Gas Reporting Program, 77 Fed. Reg. 65377 (Oct. 26, 2012),
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-10-26/pdf/2012-26425.pdf.
443. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2011).
444. See id.
445. Id. § 240.14a-8(f).
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On November 15, 2011, the National Centre for Public Policy
Research submitted its climate change risk disclosure proposal to
General Electric (GE).446 The proposal reads: “The shareholders
request that the Board of Directors prepare by November 2012, at
reasonable expense and omitting proprietary information, a
report disclosing the business risk related to developments in the
scientific, political, legislative and regulatory landscape regarding
climate change.”447 The sticking point for the National Centre for
Public Policy Research is that GE may omit the proposal under
Rule 14a-8(i)(12) if it “relates to substantially the same subject
matter as three previously submitted proposals and the most
recently submitted of those proposals did not receive the support
necessary for resubmission.”448
Demands on ExxonMobil are also illustrative of a similar
argument of a proposal falling into an excluded category due to
prior submission of a similar proposal.
The Corporate
Responsibility Agent of the Province of St. Joseph of the
Capuchin Order and supporters filed a resolution for inclusion in
the proxy statement for the next annual meeting of ExxonMobil
shareholders on December 6, 2011. The proposal if resolved and
not withdrawn, would have required
ExxonMobil’s Board of Directors create a Climate Future Task
Force including outside climate change experts to study how, like
the insurance industry, ExxonMobil, at all levels, will “factor
climate change into their models for measuring, pricing, and
distributing risk” and other alternatives to its existing business
model that depends on continued fossil fuel production and
marketing. Barring competitive information, its conclusions shall

446. Letter from Amy Ridenour, Chairman, Nat’l Ctr. for Pub. Policy
Research, to Brackett B. Denniston, Sec’y, Gen. Elec. Co. (Nov. 14, 2011) (on file
with
SEC
at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2012/
nationalcenter011912-14a8.pdf).
447. Id. at 21.
448. E-mail from Ronald O. Mueller, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, to Office
of Chief Counsel, Div. of Corp. Fin., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 12, 2011) (on file
with
SEC
at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2012/
nationalcenter011912-14a8.pdf).
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be shared with requesting shareholders at reasonable cost within
a year of the annual meeting.449

However, all indications in correspondence of the SEC as at
February 10, 2012, suggested that Exxon Mobile would include a
proposal submitted by The Sisters of St. Dominic of Caldwell,
New Jersey in its proxy materials for its upcoming annual
The St. Dominic Proposal
meeting of security holders.450
provides:
Resolved: Shareholders request that the Board of Directors adopt
quantitative goals, based on current technologies, for reducing
total greenhouse gas emissions from the Company’s products and
operations; and that the Company report to shareholders by
November 30, 2012, on its plans to achieve these goals. Such a
report will omit proprietary information and be prepared at
reasonable cost.451

Collective action eventually led to ExxonMobil including
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Goals in its Notice of 2012 Annual
Meeting and Proxy Statement (item 9).452 While recommending a
vote against the proposal, the ExxonMobil Board did make
several relevant statements. To quote, “As ExxonMobil seeks to
increase production of oil and gas to meet growing global energy
demand and to maintain leadership in return to shareholders, the
Company will continue taking steps to improve efficiency, reduce

449. Email from Elizabeth A. Ising, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, to Office of
Chief Counsel, Div. of Corp. Fin., Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Jan. 23, 2012) (on file
with
SEC
at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2012/
provinceofstjoseph021012-14a8.pdf).
450. Letter from Michael J. Reedich, Special Counsel, Div. of Corp. Fin., Sec.
& Exch. Comm’n, to Elizabeth A. Ising, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP (Feb. 10,
2012) (on file with SEC at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a8/2012/ provinceofstjoseph021012-14a8.pdf).
451. Letter from Gwendolen Noyes, to David Rosenthal, Corp. Sec’y, Exxon
Mobil Corp. (Dec. 14, 2011) (see Encl. Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions),
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2012/sisters
ofstdominic021012-14a8.pdf.
452. EXXONMOBIL, NOTICE OF 2012 ANNUAL MEETING AND PROXY STATEMENT
71-72 (2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/34088/
000119312512160085/ d277949ddef14a.htm#toc277949_23.
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emissions, and contribute to effective long-term solutions to
manage climate risks.”453
To summarize, it would in fact be difficult for the SEC to
decide that study groups and quantitative goals are similar when
Congress believes otherwise. In terms of climate adaptation and
mitigation, it is likely that socially responsible investing will grow
in populism if company’s negotiations with investors fold.
Companies therefore have an added incentive to respond. The
issues tabled illustrate not only the relevancy of a right to
information but also the capacity and willingness of people to
leverage a public concern through private international law.
Indeed, if existing human rights architecture in public
international law is found wanting in the era of climate change,
and is not yet developed sufficiently to respond to the subjective
test of equity, third generation rights, peoples’ rights or a jus
gentium, then private international law may be a more
responsive avenue for collective action and the enforcement of
extraterritorial human rights. Climate justice movements are yet
to seize this opportunity.
b. Climate Disclosure Obligations in the U.K.
Turning to the U.K. case study, not only did party manifestos
commit to rigid targets and a low-carbon economy, but
Parliament did as well. Rigorous emissions reduction mitigation
targets and a framework for adaptation were made law when the
U.K. enacted the Climate Change Act by Royal Assent on
November 26, 2008 (CCA 2008).454 The CCA 2008 establishes the
framework for the U.K.’s low carbon economy. It sets legally
binding GHG emission reduction targets,455 provides impetus for
climate change adaptation,456 establishes an institutional
structure, including the establishment of a body corporate to be
known as the Committee on Climate Change,457 confers powers to

453.
454.
455.
456.
457.

Id.
U.K. Climate Change Act, 2008, c. 27.
Id. pt. 1.
Id. pt. 4.
Id. pt. 2.
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create and regulate trading schemes,458 and provides financial
incentives to reduce domestic waste and improve recycling and
other connected purposes.459
In terms of carbon target and budgeting, the CCA 2008
establishes a duty on the Secretary of State “to ensure that the
net UK carbon account for the year 2050 is as least 80% lower
than the 1990 baseline.”460 “[F]or the budgetary period including
the year 2020,” the U.K. commits to reductions in the net carbon
account (the carbon budget) of “at least 26% lower than the 1990
baseline.”461 (The “1990 baseline” is the aggregate amount of net
U.K. carbon dioxide emissions in 1990, and net U.K. emissions for
other targeted greenhouse gases for their respective base
years).462 Other targeted GHG include methane, nitrous oxide,
hydroflourocarbons, perfluorocarbons, sulphur hexafluoride, and
any “other greenhouse gas designated as a targeted greenhouse
gas by order made by the Secretary of State.”463 Under strict
conditions, such as changes in scientific knowledge or changes in
international or EU law, a government order and affirmative
Parliamentary procedure may amend both the baseline and the
target.464 U.K. reduction targets therefore govern a robust legal
duty albeit subject to amendment under rigorous conditions.
Carbon budgets govern the attainment of the targets.465 The
first three carbon budgets, which cap emissions over five-year
periods, were set in law following the 2009 Budget.466 The U.K.
committed to cut the U.K.’s greenhouse gas emissions, compared
to 1990 levels, by twenty-two percent in the current period [20082012], twenty-eight percent in the period centered on 2015 [20132017], and thirty-four percent in the period centered on 2020
[2018-2022].467 While the U.K.’s legally binding target sets
458. Id. pt. 3.
459. Id.
460. Id. pt. 1, § 1(1).
461. U.K. Climate Change Act, 2008, c. 27, pt. 1, § 5(1)(a).
462. Id. pt. 1, § 1(2).
463. Id. pt. 1, § 24(1).
464. Id. pt. 1, § 2.
465. Id. pt. 1, § 4.
466. Id.
467. HM GOV’T, THE UK LOW CARBON TRANSITION PLAN: NATIONAL STRATEGY
FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY 36 (2009).
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emissions reduction targets to be at least twenty-six percent
lower than the 1990 baseline in 2020,468 the key interim target is
for a thirty-four percent reduction by 2020.469
In terms of reporting, the Government must prepare and
report to Parliament on policies and proposals to meet the
established carbon budgets pursuant to sections 13 and 14 of the
CCA 2008.470 The Committee on Climate Change established
pursuant to Part 2, section 32(1) of the Climate Change Act, also
has broad responsibilities for reporting and information
The Committee’s proactive (anticipatory)
dissemination.471
obligations include submitting annual reports to Parliament on
the U.K.’s progress towards the targets and budgets,472 providing
advice in connection with carbon budgets,473 and engaging in
consultation with national authorities.474 The Committee also
has ancillary anticipatory powers, such as to conduct and publish
research and analysis.475 In terms of reactive obligations to
respond to information requests, the Committee is to report on
carbon targets and budgeting.476
At a sectoral level, the Committee on Climate Change,
established as an independent body under the CCA 2008, is to
advise government as to whether international aviation and
shipping emissions should fall under the ambit of the Act or
explain to Parliament why not by December 31, 2012.477 If the
government excludes aviation and shipping then other sectors
will have to compensate accordingly. It is hard to imagine that
other sectors could compensate for the entire shortfall. This
position was taken into consideration in April 2012 when the
CCC advised Government to include international aviation and
shipping. A decision has to be made by the end of the year.

468.
469.
470.
471.
472.
473.
474.
475.
476.
477.

U.K. Climate Change Act, 2008, c. 27, pt. 1, § 5(1)(a).
HM GOV’T, supra note 467, at 36.
U.K. Climate Change Act, 2008, c. 27, pt. 1, §§ 13, 14.
Id. pt. 2, § 32(1).
Id. pt. 2 § 36(1).
Id. pt. 2 § 34(1).
Id. pt. 2 § 33(4).
Id. pt. 2 § 39(3).
Id. pt. 2 § 36.
Id. pt. 1 § 30(3).
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Publication of a Sustainable Framework for U.K. Aviation is also
relevant in this context.478 According to the Secretary of State for
Transport, the framework could be adopted by March 2013.479
The U.K. government published a response to the 2009
Aviation Report on August 25, 2011. Pursuant to the CCA 2008
(Section 30),480 the U.K. Government is revising its regulations
implementing aviation EU Emissions Trading System (ETS),481
to ensure all aircraft operators that meet the criteria for
regulation by the U.K. can come under the umbrella of U.K.
regulators. The challenge is that U.K. law no longer resides in
isolation from EU law or international law. Controversies arise
at the nexus of other regimes, climate and trade law being a
prime example.
At a European level, the “Aviation directive” (2008/101/EC),
was due for transposition into national legislation by February
2010.482
Collection of annual emissions data for aircraft
operators also began in 2010. Aircraft operators covered by the
EU’s ETS were to apply to their “competent authority” (regulator)
for a share of free CO2 allowances available from the 2010
benchmarking process by March 31, 2011.483 Each aircraft
operator is to submit allowances to the “competent authority” to
478. DEP’T FOR TRANSP., GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE COMMITTEE ON
CLIMATE CHANGE REPORT ON REDUCING CO2 EMISSIONS FROM UK AVIATION TO
2050 1 (2011).
479. Dep’t for Transp., Written Statement: Developing a Sustainable
Framework for UK Aviation: Scoping Document, GOV.UK (Mar. 29, 2011),
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/developing-a-sustainable-frameworkfor-uk-aviation-scoping-focument;
DEP’T FOR TRANSP., DEVELOPING A
SUSTAINABLE FRAMEWORK FOR UK AVIATION: SCOPING DOCUMENT, SUMMARY OF
RESPONSES (2012).
480. U.K. Climate Change Act, 2008, c.27, pt. 1, § 30.
481. Directive 2003/87, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
October 2003, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 1 (EC) (amending Directive of the European
Parliament and Council 96/61/EC(5), as amended by Directive 2004/101/EC);
Directive 2009/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April
2009, 2009 O.J. (L 140/63) (EC) (amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to
improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of
the Community).
482. Directive 2008/101/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of
19 November 2008, 2008 O.J. (L 8/3) (amending Directive 2003/87/EC to include
aviation activities in the scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading
within the Community).
483. Id.
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cover annual emissions by April of the following year.484 Similar
requirements exist for other emitters covered by the EU’s ETS.
In terms of shipping, on November 3, 2011, a CCC review
recommended that the U.K.’s share of international shipping,
which could account for up to eleven percent of total emissions
permitted under the Climate Change Act by 2050, be included in
the 2050 target.485
The CCC’s 2012 progress report is consistent with these
earlier opinions but it is yet to consider the extraterritorial effect
of such decisions. Trying to regulate international operations,
such as aviation and shipping, is certain to attract mounting
criticism of discrimination and breach of sovereignty if such laws
try to extend outside of their territorial jurisdiction or apply
domestic measures with extraterritorial implications.486 (The
Article will highlight some of these complications concerning the
law of the global commons after providing some further
background).
Returning to the U.K., the CCC concluded in April 2012 that
there is no longer any reason to account for international aviation
and shipping emissions differently to those from other sectors
(e.g. power, buildings, and surface transport). To do so, would
create uncertainty. According to the CCC,
[t]here are no additional costs associated with inclusion of
international aviation and shipping, given that these reflect
commitments that have already been made (i.e. to currently
legislated budgets, to inclusion of aviation in the EU ETS, and to
the IMO’s policy for reducing shipping emissions). The overall
costs associated with meeting a 2050 target that includes
international aviation and shipping emissions, of the order of 1-

484. Id.
485. CCC Review Suggests that the UK’s Share of International Shipping
Emissions Should be Included in Climate Targets, COMM. ON CLIMATE CHANGE
(Nov. 3, 2011), http://www.theccc.org.uk/news/press-releases/1104-ccc-reviewsuggests-that-the-uks-share-of-international-shipping-emissions-should-beincluded-in-climate-targets-3-nov-20.
486. Case C-366/10, Air Transp. Ass’n of Am. v. Sec’y of State for Energy &
Climate Change, 2011 E.C.R., available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document
/document.jsf?doclang=EN&text=&pageIndex=0&part=1&mode=DOC&docid=1
17193&occ=first&dir=&cid=306423
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2% of 2050 GDP, were accepted at the time the Climate Change
Act was legislated.487

Yet, at the same time, there is a great deal of controversy.
The EU’s measures, and those of the U.K., must be WTO
compliant. If not, they could potentially be open to challenge in
the WTO (perhaps as a claim of discriminatory treatment under
the GATT or in consideration of a potential GATS claim). In
defense, there may be justification for an inconsistent measure by
relying on an Article XX GATT exception or even by invoking
international law and the novel idea of an Article XI security
exception now that the U.N. has linked climate change to a
potential global security crisis. An international boycott could
also put an end to the scheme in its intended format.
In the U.S. a bill (H.R. 2594), entitled “European Union
Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011,” intends to
prohibit U.S operators of civil aircraft from participating in the
European Union’s emissions trading scheme, and it has other
purposes. The bill was received in the Senate October 31, 2011
and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science and
Transportation December 17, 2011.488 Senator John Thune’s bill,
also entitled “European Union Emissions Trading Scheme
Prohibition Act of 2011,” was introduced in the Senate July 12,
2011. It found more success. It was presented to the President
November 16, 2012, signed November 27, 2012, and became
public law No: 112-200.489 According to The Economist, reports of
February 6, 2012, indicated that China had provisionally barred
its airlines from participating in the EU’s ETS scheme.490 Then
at the end of the year, on November 12, 2012, Connie Hedegaard,
the European Commissioner for Climate Action, “announced that
487. UK COMM. ON CLIMATE CHANGE, MEETING CARBON BUDGETS – 2012
PROGRESS REPORT TO PARLIAMENT 77 (June 2012), available at
http://hmccc.s3.amazonaws.com/2012%20Progress/CCC_Progress%20Rep%2020
12_bookmarked_singles_1.pdf.
488. European Union Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011, H.R.
2594, 112th Cong. (2011).
489. European Union Emissions Trading Scheme Prohibition Act of 2011, Pub.
L. No. 112-200, 126 Stat. 1477 (2011).
490. J.A., China and Europe's Emission-Trading Scheme, Not free to fly,
ECONOMIST (February 8, 2012, 06:55 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs
/schumpeter/2012/02/china-and-europes-emission-trading-scheme.
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the European Union would defer the requirement under the EU
Emissions Trading System for airlines to surrender allowances
for flights into and out of Europe.”491
These controversies illustrate yet again that governance of
international climate law urges the need for a new legal
architecture to regulate the global commons. The Kyoto Protocol
provides some guidance but it is a plurilateral agreement that
does not include all parties.492 The UNFCCC framework is a
universal framework and could perhaps serve as a better lever to
find a multilateral solution in accord with common but
differentiated responsibilities and by working with the
International Civil Aviation Organization and the International
Maritime Organization, respectively. Decisions of the UNFCCC
COP 17 meeting in Durban support this direction. Under
“Cooperative sectoral approaches and sector-specific actions, in
order to enhance the implementation of Article 4, paragraph 1(c),
of the Convention,” the “Parties agreed to continue [their]
consideration of issues related to addressing emissions from
international aviation and maritime transport.”493
Finding appropriate solutions to these polemics will impinge
on the implementation of the U.K’s climate change legislation
and implementing instruments. The U.K’s CCA 2008 also
provides for trading schemes and sets out the scope for devolved
authorities to create two types of trading regulations.494 Capand-trade schemes limit activities that consist of, cause, or

491. Connie Hedegaard: “EU Willing to 'Stop the Clock' on Aviation in the EU
ETS for Flights Into and Out of Europe Until After the ICAO General Assembly
Next Autumn,” EUR. COMM’N NEWS (Dec. 11, 2012), http://ec.europa.eu/
commission_2010-2014/hedegaard/headlines/news/2012-11-12_01_en.htm.
492. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 252, art. 10(2)2 (“The Parties included in
Annex I shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases
not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine bunker fuels,
working through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the
International Maritime Organization, respectively.”).
493. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Durban,
South Africa, Nov. 28-Dec. 11, 2011, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its
Seventeenth Session, Decision 2/CP.17 Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc
Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention, para. 78,
U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1.
494. U.K. Climate Change Act, 2008, c. 27, pt. 3, § 44.
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contribute to GHG emissions.495 Incentive schemes aim to reduce
or remove GHG emissions and any cause thereof or contribution
thereto.496 Schedule 2 to the CCA 2008 sets out information that
must be incorporated within the regulations.497
Part 4 of the CCA 2008 pertains to adaptation. It includes
comprehensive reporting and information obligations.
The
Secretary of State is to lay climate change risk assessment
reports before Parliament at least once every five years and a
program setting out how the Government will respond to those
risks.
Sections 83, 84, and 85 of the CCA 2008 provide very specific
provisions about company reporting and an action plan for
government.498 Section 83 of the Climate Change Act mandated
the U.K. government to provide guidance on GHG emission
reporting by October 1, 2009.499 The U.K.’s Department for
Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), in partnership
with the Department for Energy and Climate Change (DECC),
published guidance for U.K. organizations in September 2009.500
The report sets out guidelines on measuring GHG emissions and
setting targets by which to reduce GHG emissions.501 In the
spirit of multi-nodal governance, a small business user guide was
also produced.502 The U.K.’s reporting guidance is based on
World Resources Institute and World Business Council for
Sustainable Development’s standard entitled the “GHG Protocol’s
Corporate Standard,” which provides guidance for organization
on preparing inventories of GHG emissions and targets for their
reduction.503

495. See id.
496. See id.
497. Id. pt. 3 § 46.
498. See id.
499. Id. pt. 5 § 83.
500. See DEP’T FOR ENV’T, FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS, GUIDANCE ON HOW TO
MEASURE AND REPORT YOUR GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS (2009).
501. Id.
502. See DEP’T FOR ENV’T, FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS, SMALL BUSINESS USER
GUIDE: GUIDANCE ON HOW TO MEASURE AND REPORT YOUR GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS (2009).
503. Corporate Standard, GREENHOUSE GAS PROTOCOL, http://www.ghgprotocol
.org/standards/corporate-standard (last visited Feb. 26, 2012).
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Pursuant to Section 84 of the Climate Change Act 2008, the
U.K.’s Secretary of State was tasked with laying a report on the
“contribution of reporting to climate change objectives” to the
U.K. Parliament before December 1, 2010.504 In accord with its
obligations, DEFRA published the report in November 2010.505
The report includes an assessment on disclosure duties and
assesses how investors use climate change information but it does
not go as far to recommend mandatory disclosure.506
Other issues arise when considering whether company
disclosure should be voluntary or mandatory. In 2010, a U.K.
report on “the contribution that reporting of greenhouse gas
emissions makes to the UK meeting its climate change objectives:
a review of the current evidence” found that “62% of FTSE allshare companies reported quantified figures on climate change or
energy use in their 2009 annual reports and 22% are disclosing
absolute figures on their total GHG emissions, showing improved
performance since 2004.”507 Thus akin to the U.S., market
dynamics and investor demands seem to be pushing for greater
transparency in any event. These sentiments are reflected in
section 85 of the CCA 2008.
Section 85 (1) of the CCA 2008 obliged the Secretary of State,
by no later than April 6, 2012, to:
(a) make regulations under section 416(4) of the Companies Act
2006 (c. 46) requiring the directors’ report of a company to
contain such information as may be specified in the regulations
about emissions of greenhouse gases from activities for which the
company is responsible, or
(b) lay before Parliament a report explaining why no such
regulations have been made . . . .508

504. U.K. Climate Change Act, 2008, c. 27, pt. 5, § 84.
505. See DEP’T FOR ENV’T, FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS, THE CONTRIBUTION THAT
REPORTING OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS MAKES TO THE UK MEETING ITS
CLIMATE CHANGE OBJECTIVES: A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT EVIDENCE (2010)
[hereinafter A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT EVIDENCE], available at
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/business/reporting/pdf/corporatereporting101130.pdf.
506. Id.
507. A REVIEW OF THE CURRENT EVIDENCE, supra note 505, at 7.
508. U.K. Climate Change Act, 2008, c. 27, pt. 5, § 85.
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DEFRA launched a public consultation on the “Further
Promotion of Consistent Corporate Reporting of Greenhouse Gas
Emissions” on May 11, 2011, and invited views by July 5, 2011,
on how to promote widespread and consistent reporting by U.K.
An impact assessment was made publically
companies.509
available on May 20, 2011.510 Besides business as usual with no
policy change, the assessment identified four specific options:
enhanced voluntary reporting (option 1), mandatory GHG
reporting under the Companies Act for all quoted companies
(option 2), mandatory GHG reporting under the Companies Act
for all large companies (option 3), and mandatory GHG reporting
for all companies meeting an energy use criteria (option 4).511
DEFRA published a summary of the consultation responses in
June 2012.512 The Article presents an overview of the main
findings below.
In general, participants responding to the consultation
consider that option 1, enhanced voluntary reporting, will not
level the playing field or improve consistency in reporting. 513
Besides, many voluntary schemes are already available. As to
option 2, mandatory reporting for quoted companies, there is a
general view that quoted companies should be held to account but
the disadvantages include missing large private companies, the
number is too few and it targets those who are already likely to
report.514 Option 3, mandatory reporting for large companies,
was clearly a favorite although the majority of trade associations
and professional bodies and a sizeable minority of companies
supported voluntary reporting rather than regulation.515 An
509. Letter from Alice Douglas, Dep’t for Env’t Food & Rural Affairs, to
Consultee (May 11, 2011) (on file with author), available at
www.defra.gov.uk/consult/files/110511-ghg-emissions-letter1.pdf.
510. See DEP’T FOR ENV’T, FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS, IMPACT ASSESSMENT OF
OPTIONS
FOR
COMPANY
GHG
REPORTING
(2011),
available
at
http://www.defra.gov.uk/consult/files/110511-ghg-emissions-ia1.pdf.
511. Id. at 1.
512. See DEP’T FOR ENV’T, FOOD & RURAL AFFAIRS, MEASURING AND REPORTING
OF GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS BY UK COMPANIES, SUMMARY OF CONSULTATION
RESPONSES (2012), available at http://www.defra.gov.uk/consult/files/20120620ghg-consult-sumresp.pdf.
513. Id. at 5.
514. Id. at 5-6.
515. Id. at 6.
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added advantage of company reporting was to facilitate
companies to monitor and manage supply chain emissions.516
There would therefore be a trickle-down effect to smaller
companies.
Disadvantages
include
disproportionate
administrative costs and a heavy burden on new reporters.
Option 4’s focus on energy intensive businesses is material but
these companies are likely to be reporting already.517 Option 4 is
also complex. It is not consistent with the Companies Act and
participants responding to the consultation believed that
numerous exclusions and derogations could potentially weaken
reporting anyhow.518 Besides these four options, participant’s
put forward other suggestions for improvement, including more
targeted reporting, sectoral commitments, a phasing in,
leveraging the assistance of NGO’s, and building on best
practices.519
Following the public consultation, the Government has agreed
with the majority of respondents to introduce regulation to
require some companies to report their GHG emissions in the
directors’ report of their annual report. The Government is
committed to reducing the regulatory burden on companies and
so has decided to introduce Option 2 (regulation for all quoted
companies) which has the lowest regulatory cost of the regulatory
options. Experience of this introduction will be used to update the
cost and benefit information contained in the final impact
assessment. In 2016, the Government will take a decision, based
on this updated information, whether to extend the requirement
to all large companies.520

More targeted reporting is sensible. Going forward, the
government will need to ensure that information is relevant.
Attention is required to structure the modalities by which to
discipline climate change information. Accountability, integrity,
timeliness, and transparency determine, inter alia, the subjective

516.
517.
518.
519.
520.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 7.
Id. at 22.
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test of a right to information and ought to support the objectivity
of relevant information.
National directions also need to reflect emerging
international and regional guidelines for monitoring, reporting,
and verification (MRV). (Some of these were referred to earlier
under the respective treaty framework of the UNFCCC and the
plurilateral Kyoto Protocol). “PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC),
ERM, and the Institute of Environmental Management and
Assessment (IEMA) concur with the prevailing international view
that emission reporting demonstrates the current business
situation, enables target setting and progress tracking and is
therefore central to the commitment of the company to action.”521
Current reporting structures, however, are often unwieldy,
fragmented, and leave little room for investors (or government) to
make useful comparisons. In part, this is due to the absence of a
common accounting regime, which is an objective criterion.
However, there are also divergences concerning the effectiveness
of any substantive agreement.
While promoting voluntary reporting may be a good way
forward, at least in terms of the numbers issued by the SEC in
the U.S. and DEFRA in the U.K., there is still the issue of how to
make the best use of the data to reinforce proactive (anticipatory)
obligations and reactive (responsive) obligations governing the
right to information. Comparisons may not be meaningful
without some degree of conformity to reporting guidelines. An
enhanced “template-based” reporting mechanism could be
developed online; but without employing appropriate qualitative
techniques, a lot of important yet more subjective information
that influences decisions will simply be foregone. Developing
completely different guidelines at national levels may not be that
helpful anyhow. Climate harm crosses borders.
The U.S. approach to climate change disclosure provides
some solutions that could carry through internationally.
Voluntary company disclosure in the U.S. leads to the provision of
far more extensive information, but voluntary disclosure is in no
way a substitute for a cohesive de jure governing framework of
conformity and compliance regulation. Such pitfalls of failing to
521. Id.
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collate and compare relevant information have already been
observed at the international level where a mishmash of
reporting structures have resulted in procedural and
implementation difficulties. Moreover, information needs not
only to be relevant, it needs to be disciplined for effect. An
examination of the modalities that discipline information is far
more likely to give direction to effective regulatory options. As
identified above, these issues are equally identified within the
U.K. and require further consideration as the U.K. turns to
implement option 2 (mandatory reporting for quoted companies).
There are still other issues for the U.K. government to
consider before 2016. Turning to an extension of the proposed
mandatory regulatory options, any such reporting for
incorporated companies would still fall under the ambit of
regulations under Section 416(4) of the Companies Act 2006.522
These regulations would thereby apply to U.K. incorporated
companies required to prepare a director’s report as part of their
annual reporting obligations.523
For many small businesses, the cost of even more weighty
reporting could prove unsustainable.
Larger businesses
contribute more to GHG emissions. They should therefore
contribute more to the adverse effects of climate change. Even for
listed companies it is uncertain as to what degree their
contributions to the U.K. economy ought to be offset by their
contributions to planetary environmental harm. What sort of tax
breaks, if any, should be set in place to support heavier reporting
burdens? What types of other support mechanisms will be
considered? What will be the design of these mechanisms so as
not to impose an unfair restriction on trade? These are tough but
important questions.
Regulating the right to information and the duty to disclose
does not reside in isolation from other bodies of international law.
To be prepared for such eventualities, companies should seek to
understand their respective business plans behind the
reinforcement of the right to information. Government also needs
to comprehend the extraterritorial effects of its decisions.

522. See Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, § 416(4) (U.K.).
523. See id.
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Participants responding to the U.K.’s government
consultation also identified with questions of equity and fairness
in the sense of common but differentiated responsibilities.
Differentiating the scale of obligations owed by unlisted
companies vis-a-vis quoted companies does not mean that
loopholes should exist ad infinitum.
Establishing stricter
disclosure requirements for quoted companies and voluntary
reporting for unlisted companies is a move in the right direction.
Notwithstanding, this option still lets large private companies
and significant trusts slip through the loop. Larger companies
and trust holdings are likely to contribute more to climate change
than small enterprises and many will already have solid investor
relations teams in place.
Distinguishing between reactive and proactive reporting
obligations for larger companies may be helpful. However, as
aforementioned, reporting obligations should not restrict trade or
competition. A high degree of rigorous regulations could emerge
as reinforcing non-tariff barriers to trade and keep the U.K.
economy in abeyance. Any attempt to impose regulations on
other countries is likely to do the same. Imposing stricter
regulations on companies that consume more energy may evolve
as a form of productivity capping that impedes local competition
and simply encourages companies to go offshore and take all the
economic benefits of steady jobs, local livelihoods, and
government income with them.
Supply chains are global so local decisions should not exist in
isolation from the broader context within which national law
resides. It is likely that U.K. reporting will have to align far more
with EU and international developments in meeting objective and
subjective tests of equity at some stage. Some U.K. companies
already report on their GHG emissions, either voluntarily or due
to obligations under the EU’s ETS, the Carbon Reduction
Commitment (CRC) Energy Efficiency Scheme, and other climate
change agreements, which are discussed below.
As aforementioned, the ETS is a central component of the
U.K’s policy for delivering emissions reductions in the U.K. and
across the EU. The EU’s ETS Directive (Directive 2003/87/EC, as
amended by Directive 2009/29/EC, which had a deadline for
transposition by Member States by December 31, 2012) governs
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the EU’s cap-and-trade scheme.524
Directive 2003/87/EC,
introduced in 2005 by the U.K’s Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Trading Scheme 2005,525 provides for access to information
subject to Directive 2003/4/EC. It sets a “cap” on the total
amount of certain greenhouse gases that factories, power plants,
and other installations in the system can emit. In addition,
provisions for MRV are mandated to European Member States for
certain specified activities holding GHG emissions permits.
Commission Decision 2007/589/EC of July 18, 2007, establishes
guidelines for the monitoring and reporting of greenhouse gas
emissions pursuant to Directive 2003/87/EC of the European
Parliament and of the Council.526 The Monitoring and Reporting
Guidelines (MRG) are to be used for the 2008-2012 phase. New
Regulations concerning EU ETS monitoring, reporting,
verification and authentication will apply to emissions from
January 1, 2013. In accordance with the revised ETS Directive
(2009/29/EC), phase III of the EU Emissions Trading System will
be from 2013-2020.527
In 2009, Commission Decision 2009/339/EC of April 16, 2009,
amended Decision 2007/589/EC as regards to the inclusion of
monitoring and reporting guidelines for emissions and tonkilometer data from aviation activities.528 Aviation activities
were included in the scheme by virtue of Directive

524. Directive 2003/87, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13
October 2003, 2003 O.J. (L 275) 1 (EC) (amending Directive of the European
Parliament and Council 96/61/EC(5), as amended by Directive 2004/101/EC);
Directive 2009/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April
2009, 2009 O.J. (L 140/63) (EC) (amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to
improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of
the Community).
525. The Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Scheme Regulations, 2005, S.I.
2005/925 (U.K.).
526. See id.
527. Directive 2009/29/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council,
2009 O.J. (L 140/63) (EC), art. 11 (amending Directive 2003/87/EC so as to
improve and extend the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading scheme of
the Community).
528. Directive 2009/339, of the European Parliament and Council, 2009 O.J. (L
103) (EC).
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2008/101/EC.529 In addition, the ETS scheme was further
improved and extended by virtue of Directive 2009/29/EC.530
A draft Commission Regulation on the approval of a
simplified tool developed by the European organization for air
safety navigation (Eurocontrol) to estimate the fuel consumption
of certain small emitting aircraft operators is also under
negotiation.531 The draft version was approved by the Climate
Change Committee on February 17, 2010, and was sent to the
European Parliament for scrutiny.532 The U.K. could also
consider reinforcing the alignment of measurement, reporting
and verification of GHG emissions by U.K. companies by
industrial sector.
The U.K.’s Carbon Reduction Commitment (recently
renamed the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme) is an energy saving
and carbon emissions reduction scheme that requires mandatory
reporting of emissions for all organizations using more than 6,000
MWh per year of electricity (equivalent to an annual electricity
bill of about £500,000) not covered by the EU ETS or certain
other Climate Change Agreements.533
The CRC Energy
Efficiency Scheme Order 2010 came into force on March 22,
2010.534 The Scheme started on April 1, 2010. With the view to
simplify the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme, DECC undertook a
consultation between March 27, 2012 and June 18, 2012. The
results showed broad support for a simplification package and in
response the Government intends to make an order to come into
force on June 1, 2013 with the second phase starting in April
529. Directive 2008/101, of the European Parliament and Council, 2008 O.J. (L
8) (EC); see also Decision 2009/450/EC, of the European Parliament and Council
of 8 June 2009, 2009 O.J. (L 149) 69 (explaining the interpretation of the
aviation activities listed in Annex I to Directive 2003/87/EC).
530. Directive 2009/29, of the European Parliament and Council, 2009 O.J. (L
140) (EC).
531. EUROPEAN COMM’N, DRAFT COMMISSION REGULATION ON THE APPROVAL OF A
SIMPLIFIED TOOL DEVELOPED BY THE EUROPEAN ORGANISATION FOR AIR SAFETY
NAVIGATION (EUROCONTROL) TO ESTIMATE THE FUEL CONSUMPTION OF CERTAIN
SMALL EMITTING AIRCRAFT OPERATORS 1 (2009), available at http://www.lne.be/en
/ets-aviation/overview-legislation/100217small-emitter-regulation-post-isc-4.pdf.
532. Id.
533. Carbon Reduction Commitment, CRC MAGAZINE (Oct. 20, 2010), http://w
ww.carbonreductioncommitment.info/.
534. CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme Order, S.I. 2010/768 (U.K.).
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2014.535 The Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne made
an announcement to this effect to the House of Commons in his
autumn statement of December 5, 2012 concerning carbon taxes.
He said, “[T]he Government will simplify the CRC energy
efficiency scheme from 2013.”536 The Government will review the
effectiveness of the CRC Energy Efficiency Scheme in 2016.537
The climate change levy (CCL), introduced as Climate
Change Levy Agreements and a type of pricing mechanism under
the 2000 Finance Act in 2001, could also perhaps be reviewed at
this time.538 The CCL is a type of levy that targets energyintensive industries and specified energy products (taxable
commodities) permitting up to a 65% discount (90% on electricity
from April 2013) provided the companies meet targets to improve
energy efficiency or reduce their carbon emissions.539 Following
another consultation in 2012, a new Climate Change Agreement
(CCA) scheme will start in April 2013 (the current scheme expires
in March 2013).
There are some issues to be worked through. In 2008 the
House of Commons reported that,
The CCL has not worked quite as expected. According to
economic theory, businesses should have acted rationally by
seeking to reduce their costs through increased energy efficiency.
In practice, they appear to have needed an extra stimulus to
change their approach to energy use.
This has profound
implications for climate change policy more widely. If even large
companies require additional policies to drive behavioural
change, this must be all the more true for small businesses,
535. U.K. DEP’T OF ENERGY AND CLIMATE CHANGE, GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO
CONSULTATION ON SIMPLIFYING THE CRC ENERGY EFFICIENCY SCHEME 13
(2012).
536. HM TREASURY, AUTUMN STATEMENT 70 (2012).
537. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO THE CONSULTATION ON SIMPLIFYING THE CRC
ENERGY EFFICIENCY SCHEME, supra note 535, at 14; HM TREASURY, AUTUMN
STATEMENT 70 (2012).
538. Malcolm Hill et. al., Impacts of Climate Change Agreements on British
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, 22 ENERGY & ENV’T 343 (2011).
539. Climate Change Agreements: Policy and Legislation, DEP’T OF ENERGY &
CLIMATE CHANGE, http://www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/emissions/ ccas/ccas_
policy/ccas_policy.aspx (last visited Dec. 15, 2012); Climate Change Levy, HM
REVENUE & CUSTOMS, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/climate-change-levy/index.htm
(last visited Dec. 15, 2012).
THE
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public bodies, and private households. The Government should
report on how it is applying this lesson the across the whole of
the UK Climate Change Programme.540

The implications are equally relevant at the international level
considering the challenges in developing subjective or behavioral
tests to fulfill objective guarantees.
At some stage, it would be useful to undertake a
comprehensive review of all the U.K.’s reporting instruments.
2016 may be a good year. 2016 was mentioned above concerning
a decision on extending Consistent Corporate Reporting of
Greenhouse Gas Emissions. Other reporting requirements could
be brought into the 2016 review. Given parallel discussions
taking place in the EU and internationally, and the complexity of
the overall reporting regime, government may consider keeping
the voluntary regime but support it by firming up the reporting
structures so that it can make useful comparisons. Appropriate
business incentives could also enhance reporting. Regulating
disclosure obligations through bilateral negotiations and
voluntary agreements on a company-by-company basis in line
with predetermined regulatory guidelines could also supplement
this overall package. While this latter option may appear
expensive, the higher upfront costs should be balanced by lower
back end costs. The analysis may be far more robust and useful,
and duplications and misinterpretations, which are inevitable
with yes or no quantitative scales, may be avoided.
To summarize, companies are already overburdened with
reporting requirements, so any reporting system should aim to
find a balance between facilitating companies to pursue their
profit agendas and their obligations to present and future
generations. The right to information is a fundamental human
right that invokes a reactive obligation to respond and a proactive
obligation to collect and disseminate information. The evolution
of the duty to disclose reinforces these legal obligations and raises
serious issues for private sector enterprises. Not only could
liability arise due to fraudulent representation but also due to the
failure to disclose climate information or even inadequate
540. HOUSE OF COMMONS, SELECT COMMITTEE
SECOND REPORT (2008).
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disclosure thereof. Similar to the U.S., the U.K. leverages
corporate action through broad consultation processes that
engage a plurality of stakeholders, media awareness, investor
pressure, sectoral regulation, corporate and finance laws, and
multi-level governance. Both rely on a global framework and a
universal approach to the right to information.
If U.K. regulation evolves in isolation from the supporting
framework of regional and international law it is likely to
fragment the right to information even more and merely place a
higher burden on U.K. companies. Any decision made in the U.K.
may therefore benefit by considering streamlining the U.K.’s
entire reporting ambit (locally, regionally, and globally). A
common international accounting regime is required but this will
not have good effect if local regimes are fragmented. Helping
higher users to analyze their inputs and outputs and find
alternative and more efficient energy solutions should link to the
overall package of reinforcing effectiveness at the local level. A
far more cohesive right to know and duty to disclose could
consider harmonizing new instruments to regulate quoted
companies with those requirements already set out under
existing instruments, including the EU’s ETS, the Carbon
Reduction Commitment (CRC), and other Climate Change
Agreements.
III.

A PATHWAY TO PROVIDENCE

To conclude, this Article has demonstrated how general
international public law, human rights law, and environmental
law inform the right to information about the adverse effects of
climate change. Whether at the national or international level,
the right to climate change information hinges on guaranteeing
and enforcing both proactive and reactive obligations.
In
advancing climate law and the right to information, actors need
to align their respective obligations (locally, regionally, and
within the context of the constitutionalism of international
climate law). Drawing on the willingness and capacity of all
parties to negotiate and reach consensus on extraterritorial
agreements will serve as an impetus for this alignment.
The findings show that the right to know and the duty to
disclose rely not only on the relevancy of information, but also on

113

2012]

RIGHT TO KNOW AND DUTY TO DISCLOSE

253

how the law disciplines that information.
Accountability,
integrity, timeliness, and transparency embellish “what
information is - or is not - taken to be directly relevant” and
strengthen a theory of justice by the employ of both objective and
subjective tests of equity.
Balancing contradictions between the relevancy of
information and the disciplines governing the right to
information remain at the heart of many controversies. States
and non-state actors, individuals, communities, and businesses
are often unable to exercise their right to effective justice unless
they have an objective understanding of the relevant information
within the context of a disciplined universal framework. In turn,
the quality of the right to information will inform actor’s means to
participate in decision-making processes and access effective
remedies. Likewise, such actions need to be put into a unified
and universal context.
The UNFCCC is a binding universal treaty that establishes
the legal architecture by which to underpin rules, and other
norms, that will, inter alia, regulate GHG emissions and facilitate
agreed outcomes that have legal force. Deep uncertainty means
that the informational inputs that support such a system can
never be completely reliable. They are forever changing. Leaving
aside the scientific debate and perpetually changing imperfect
information about future costs and benefits, there is still a need
to give effect to a robust system for monitoring, reporting, and
verification that resides within a universal constitutionalism of
international climate law. All countries, not just the developing,
require accountability, integrity, and temporality of comparative
accounting rules and effective processes.
Upholding the integrity of the UNFCCC is far more
dependent on reaching consensus on universally agreed
normative processes within the constitutionalism of international
climate law than introducing more ad hoc institutional
restructuring arrangements or deep structural adjustments. The
later sometimes even serve as engines of destabilization and
fragmentation and they do little to build a systematically
coherent architecture of human rights for the global commons.
As disputes about reporting aviation emissions show, the former
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depends on reaching a unified normative accord, a jus gentium, at
the global level before being able to implement it nationally.
Going forward, climate law negotiators could make
significant strides in advancing the right to information by
finding a better balance between substance and form and
between the relevancy and disciplines of the right to know and
the duty to disclose.
Governments and non-governmental
organizations could help facilitate the process of universal
constitutionalism by making clear statements in this regard,
perhaps at the next UNFCCC COP to be held in Warsaw, Poland,
at the end of 2013, if not before. Consolidating a framework for
the right to climate information could be a helpful step forward;
but, to do so, there needs to be a breath of fresh air and the
“willingness and capacity” to discipline information for climate
justice.541

541. Calling of an Int’l Conf. on Freedom of Info., supra note 2, at 95.
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